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Abstract
We consider the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) while al-
locating a set of indivisible items to n agents. The NSW is a popular objective that provides a
balanced tradeoff between the often conflicting requirements of fairness and efficiency, defined
as the weighted geometric mean of agents’ valuations. For the symmetric additive case of the
problem, where agents have the same weight with additive valuations, the first constant-factor
approximation algorithm was obtained in 2015. This led to a flurry of work obtaining constant-
factor approximation algorithms for the symmetric case under mild generalizations of additive,
and O(n)-approximation algorithms for more general valuations and for the asymmetric case.
In this paper, we make significant progress towards both symmetric and asymmetric NSW
problems. We present the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for the symmetric
case under Rado valuations. Rado valuations form a general class of valuation functions that
arise from maximum cost independent matching problems, including as special cases assign-
ment (OXS) valuations and weighted matroid rank functions. Furthermore, our approach also
gives the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for the asymmetric case under Rado
valuations, provided that the maximum ratio between the weights is bounded by a constant.
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1 Introduction
Fair and efficient allocation of resources is a fundamental problem in many disciplines, including
computer science, economics, and social choice theory; see, e.g., several excellent books written
specifically on this problem [7, 10, 11, 48, 60, 61, 70]. The Nash social welfare (NSW) is a popular
objective that provides a balanced tradeoff between the often conflicting requirements of fairness
and efficiency in contrast to the other popular social welfare concepts, including the utilitarian
social welfare and the max-min fairness, also known as the Santa Claus problem. It is no wonder
that it was discovered independently in several different contexts: First, as the unique solution to a
bargaining game by Nash in 1950 [39, 53]. It also coincides with the popular notion of competitive
equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI) in economics [66], and as a notion of proportional fairness
in networking [40].
In the discrete NSW problem, one needs to allocate a set G of m indivisible items to a set A
of n agents where each agent i has a valuation function vi : 2
G → R+ and weight (entitlement)
wi > 0. The goal is to find an allocation maximizing the NSW, defined as the weighted geometric
mean of the valuations:
max


(∏
i∈A
vi(Si)
wi
)1/∑i∈A wi
: {Si : i ∈ A} forms a partition of G

 . (1)
We refer to the special case when all agents have equal weight (i.e., wi = 1) as the symmetric NSW
problem, and call the general case the asymmetric NSW problem. While the early works only
considered the symmetric NSW, the asymmetric case has also been well-studied since the seventies
[33, 38], and has found many applications in different areas, such as bargaining theory [14, 44],
water resource allocation [20, 35], and climate agreements [71]. Another distinctive feature of NSW
is invariance under scaling of the valuation functions, i.e., one obtains the same optimal partition
even if some agents over- or under-report their valuations by a constant factor.
Computational complexity Finding an exact solution to the NSW problem is NP-hard even
for two identical agents with additive valuations: observe that the partition problem reduces to
the NSW problem. Moreover, the problem is NP-hard to approximate within a factor better than
1.069 [26] for additive valuations, and better than 1.5819 [29] for submodular valuations. These
results hold already in the symmetric case.
For the symmetric NSW problem with additive valuations, Cole and Gkatzelis [17], in a break-
through result, provided the first constant-factor approximation algorithm using an approach based
on spending-restricted market equilibrium, whose analysis was later improved in [18]. Anari et al. [1]
provided another approach using the theory of real stable polynomials. Barman et al. [8] developed
yet another approach based on local search that provides the state-of-the-art approximation factor
of 1.45.
These approaches have also been extended to obtain constant-factor approximation algorithms
for mild generalizations of additive, namely, budget-additive [27], separable piecewise linear concave
(SPLC) [2], and their combination budget-SPLC [15] valuations. All these approaches heavily
exploit the symmetry of agents and the characteristics of ‘additive-like’ valuations, such as the
notion of a maximum bang-per-buck (MBB) items, which make them hard to extend to significantly
more general settings.
For more general valuations or the asymmetric NSW problem, new approaches [9, 16, 29] have
been recently developed, resulting in the state-of-the-art factor of O(n) for the asymmetric Nash
problem under subadditive valuations. However, their analysis is based on averaging arguments,
making them hard to yield a factor better than O(n) even for the special cases, e.g., OXS valuations,
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or only two types of agents with weights 1 or 2 under additive valuations. Therefore, O(n) remained
the best approximation factor for the symmetric NSW problem beyond ‘additive-like’ valuations or
for the asymmetric NSW problem.
Our contributions We make significant progress towards both symmetric and asymmetric NSW
problems. Firstly, we obtain a constant-factor approximation for a broad class of submodular val-
uations we call Rado valuations. This is a common generalization of OXS valuations and weighted
matroid functions. A Rado valuation of an agent i ∈ A is specified by a bipartite graph (G, Vi;Ei),
edge costs ci : Ei → R+ and a matroid Mi = (Vi,Ii). The value vi(S) of a subset of items S ⊆ G
is given as the maximum cost of a matching between nodes in S and nodes in Vi such that the
endpoints in Vi form an independent set in the matroid Mi. Relation between popular classes of
valuations functions follows [45, 55]:
Additive ( SPLC (
OXS
Weighted Matroid Rank
( Rado ( GS ( Submodular ( XOS ( Subadditive .
Theorem 1.1. There exists a polynomial-time 256e3/e≈772-approximation algorithm for the sym-
metric Nash social welfare problem under Rado valuations.
Rado valuations form a subclass of gross substitutes (GS) valuations. In fact, it was conjectured
by Frank in 2003 that every GS valuation arises as a Rado valuation, see Section 2.2. In Section 7.3
we give a counterexample and formulate a slight strengthening of this conjecture.
Secondly, we obtain a constant-factor approximation for the asymmetric NSW problem under
Rado valuations, provided that the maximum ratio between the weights is bounded by a constant.
Assume the weights wi of the agents fall in the interval [1, γ − 1] for some γ ≥ 2.
Theorem 1.2 (Main). There exists a polynomial-time 256γ3-approximation algorithm for the Nash
social welfare problem with Rado valuation functions. For additive valuation functions, there exists
a polynomial-time 16γ-approximation algorithm.1
We note that even if the weights of the agents are bounded, an O(1)-approximation for the
symmetric case does not yield an O(1)-approximation to the asymmetric case.2 Table 1 summarizes
the updated best approximation guarantees for the problem under various valuation functions.
Valuations Symmetric Asymmetric
Additive 1.45 [8] O(γ) [Theorem 1.2]
SPLC 1.45 [15] O(γ3) [Theorem 1.2]
Rado O(1) [Theorem 1.1] O(γ3) [Theorem 1.2]
Subadditive O(n) [9, 16] O(n) [9, 16]
Table 1: Summary of the best approximation algorithms for the NSW problem. Definitions of
valuations functions are deferred to Section 2.1.
1We note that γ in the theorem can be replaced by min
{
O
(
γ
log γ
)
, n
}
as we show in Section 2.3 and Section 8.
2To illustrate this point, consider two items and two agents with weights w1 = 2, w2 = 1 and additive valuations
v1({1}) = M , v1({2}) = 1, v2({1}) = M + 1, v2({2}) = 1, and so on, where M is an arbitrarily large number. The
unique optimal solution to the symmetric case (by setting w′1 = w
′
2 = 1) is allocating good 2 to agent 1 and good 1 to
agent 2. However, this returns an NSW value (M +1)1/3 for the original weights. This can be worse by an arbitrary
factor than the value M2/3 obtainable by assigning good 1 to agent 1 and good 2 to agent 2.
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1.1 Main ideas
Our approach is based on a mixed-integer programming relaxation, using a careful combination of
convex programming relaxations and combinatorial arguments.
The NSW problem is given with discrete valuation functions vi : 2
G → R+. In order to apply
convex programming techniques, we first need to obtain a convex programming relaxation; already
this turns out to be a nontrivial task. As explained in Section 2.2, gross substitute valuations are
the subclass of discrete valuations where a concave extension can be naturally defined.
Already for additive valuations, the natural relaxation of the NSW problem has unbounded
integrality gap [17]. In order to formulate a mixed integer program, we identify a set H of n items,
and require that all these items must be integrally allocated. We do not know if this relaxation can
be solved in polynomial time: we only provide an approximate solution to a further relaxation.
For the set H, we aim to identify the set of the ‘most important’ items. We find the allocation
maximizing the NSW value assuming each agent can obtain just a single item, and select H as the
set of the items selected in this allocation. This can be efficiently solved as a maximum weight
matching problem. The algorithm in [29] also starts with such a matching. One cannot commit
to assigning these items to the agents, as it may result in an arbitrary bad outcome; the approach
in [29] is an intricate combinatorial scheme with iterated matchings and reallocations to obtain
an O(n log n) approximation for submodular valuations. Our result implies that the mixed integer
relaxation that requires H to be integrally allocated has a constant integrality gap, in contrast
to the standard continuous relaxation. As a possible explanation why this happens, we make a
connection to the approach of Cole and Gkatzelis [17] in Section 9, showing that all ‘expensive’
items in the spending restricted equilibrium will be included in H.
We give a detailed exposition of the overall approach and formulate the main lemmas in Sec-
tion 3, split into five phases. Here, we only give a high-level overview. Phase I selects H as above.
Phase II approximates the mixed relaxation by another mixed integer program (Mixed+matching)
that assigns items G\H fractionally to the agents, and at most one item from H to each agent. This
is not a relaxation of the original problem anymore, as an optimal solution may allocate multiple
items from H to the same agent. However, (Mixed+matching) approximates the original mixed
within a factor γ. We note that this is the only part of our reductions that depends on the bound
γ.
Solving (Mixed+matching) still does not turn out to be easy. In Phase III, we find a 2-
approximate solution by first solving the restriction to G \ H—a convex program—then optimally
assigning the items in H.
All reductions thus far work for general subadditive valuations. In Phase IV we exploit combi-
natorial properties of the concave extension of Rado valuations to obtain a sparse solution. We first
show that the restriction of (Mixed+matching) to G \H has a basic optimal solution with at most
|A|+2|G \H| non-zero variables. We note that this is on its own an interesting new rational convex
program [67], the first example we are aware of with an exponential number of constraints, given
by a separation oracle. We then further sparsify the solution to at most 2|A| + |G \ H| non-zero
variables, at the expense of losing at most half of the objective value.
At this point, we have a mixed integer solution that is not too far from an integral one. Namely,
H is already allocated integrally and G \ H is allocated to agents fractionally but with at most
2|A| + |G \ H| non-zero variables. Thus, it suffices to fix a suitable subset of 2|A| fractional
variables to zero of the non-zero to obtain a feasible solution, and round the rest of the variables
to 1. However, this may not be viable for any subset.
In the final Phase V, we make use of the choice of H as the set of items allocated in the best
allocation with one item per agent. Using this property, we carefully recombine the matching in
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the mixed assignment and the initial allocation of the items in H by swapping around alternating
cycles. This enables the final rounding step to obtain an integer allocation.
1.2 Further related work
We briefly mention further results on Nash social welfare, utilitarian social welfare and max-min
welfare.
Nash social welfare NSW has turned out to be the focal point in fair division. Amenable fairness
properties of NSW are underlined by Caragiannis et al. [13], who call the solution ‘unreasonably’
fair and efficient. The same paper introduces an algorithm for finding optimum NSW allocation,
which is deployed on the website spliddit.org and used for fair allocation of indivisible goods [30].
Approximation algorithms for the NSW also preserve many nice fairness properties, as shown
in [12, 16, 47].
Utilitarian social welfare In this setting, the goal is to find a partition of the items that
maximizes the sum of agents’ valuations. Note that this problem is straightforward for additive
valuations. For gross substitutes valuations (see Definition 2.1), the optimal partition corresponds
to a Walrasian equilibrium: there exists a price vector such that each agent receives an optimal
bundle at such prices. Such an allocation can be efficiently computed [32, 41]. Gu¨l and Stachetti
[32] also showed that the converse is essentially true: if a class C of valuation functions contains
all unit demand valuations, and there exists a Walrasian equilibrium for an arbitrary choice of
valuation functions from C, then C must be a subset of gross substitutes valuations.
For submodular valuations there is an ee−1 ≈ 1.5819-approximation algorithm by Vondra´k [69]
and this is the best possible [43]. Feige [24] gave a 2-approximation algorithm for the social welfare
problem under subadditive valuations assuming access to particular demand queries.
Max-min welfare In this problem the objective is to maximize the minimum valuation of any
agent. This NP-hard problem can be seen as an absolute fairness problem and it has been ap-
propriately named the Santa Claus problem [6]. It is a significant open problem to obtain a
constant-factor approximation for additive valuations: such algorithms are known only for a re-
stricted subclasses, see Annamalai et al. [3], Davies et al. [19]. For additive (resp. submodular)
valuations the best approximation factor is O( 3
√
n log3 n) by Asadpour and Saberi [4] (resp. O(n)
by Khot and Ponnuswami [42]).
Organization of the paper In Section 2 we formally define all the notation and concepts. Here,
we also explain the significance of the gross substitutes and Rado valuations for the problem and
our approach. Missing proofs from Section 2, as well as a detailed discussion of Rado valuations
are presented in Section 7. In Section 3 we give a rigorous overview of the algorithm together with
main lemmas proof ideas. Sections 4-6 contain more detailed arguments for the various phases.
Section 9 compares our approach with the spending restricted equilibria in [17]. Concluding remarks
are given in Section 10.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout, we let G denote a finite set of m indivisible items (goods), and A a set of n agents.
Each of the agents i ∈ A are equipped with a valuation function vi : 2G → R. Throughout, we use
the shorthand notation vij = vi({j}) to denote the valuation of agent i for a single unit of item j.
Given a subset S ⊆ G we will denote with χS the characteristic vector of S. For k ∈ Z, we
let [k] = {1, 2, . . . , k}. A bipartite graph (U, V ;E) has node set U ∪ V and an undirected edge set
E ⊆ U × V . For an edge subset F ⊆ E, we let δU (E) and δV (E) denote the set of endpoints of E
in U and in V , respectively.
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A matroid on a finite ground set V is given as M = (V,I), where I ⊆ 2V is a nonempty
collection of independent sets. This collection is required to satisfy the independence axioms:
(I1) Monotonicity: if X ∈ I then Y ∈ I for all Y ⊆ X, and
(I2) Exchange property: if X,Y ∈ I, |X| < |Y |, then there exists an y ∈ Y \ X such that
X ∪ {y} ∈ I.
The rank function rM : 2
V → Z+ associated with the matroid M is defined with rM(X) denoting
the size of the largest independent subset of X ⊆ V . A fundamental property implied by (I2) is
that every maximal independent set in X has size rM(X). The value rM(V ) is called the rank of
the matroid, and the maximal independent sets are called bases. A set X ⊆ V is in I if and only
if r(X) = |X|. We refer the reader to [63, Part IV] for matroids and their role in optimization.
2.1 Valuation functions
By a valuation function, we mean a function v : 2G → R with v(∅) = 0. Let us start with two
simple examples of valuations. The function v is an additive valuation if v(S) =
∑
j∈S vj , and a
unit demand valuation if v(S) = maxj∈S vj where vj ∈ R+ represents the value of item j ∈ G.
We now define some basic properties. A function v : 2G → R+ is monotone if v(X) ≤ v(Y ) for
any X ⊆ Y ⊆ G, subadditive if
v(X) + v(Y ) ≥ v(X ∪ Y ) ∀X,Y ⊆ G , (2)
and submodular if
v(X) + v(Y ) ≥ v(X ∩ Y ) + v(X ∪ Y ) ∀X,Y ⊆ G . (3)
Additive valuations and unit demand valuations satisfy all the above properties. Another basic
example of submodular functions is the rank function rM of a matroid M = (V,I). In fact, every
integer valued monotone submodular set function on V with v(X) ≤ |X| arises as the rank function
of a matroid. Given a weighting g ∈ RV , the weighted rank function rg(X) is the maximum g-weight
of a maximal independent set in X; this function is also submodular.
Gross substitute valuations For a price vector p ∈ RG and a subset S ⊆ G, we let p(S) =∑
j∈S pj . For a valuation function v : 2
G → R+, the utility obtainable at prices p from a set S ⊆ G
is v(S) − p(S). The demand correspondence is defined as
D(v, p) := argmax
S⊆G
v(S)− p(S) .
An important class of valuation functions is gross substitutes valuations, defined by Kelso and
Crawford in 1982 [41]:
Definition 2.1. The valuation function v : 2G → R+ is a gross substitutes (GS) valuation if for
any p, p′ ∈ RG such that p′ ≥ p and any S ∈ D(v, p), there exists an S′ ∈ D(v, p′) such that
S ∩ {j : pj = p′j} ⊆ S′.
That is, if we have an optimal bundle at prices p and increase some of the prices, then there will
be an optimal bundle that contains all items whose price remained unchanged. For a comprehensive
survey on GS valuations, we refer the reader to the survey by Paes Leme [58].
Gu¨l and Stachetti [32] showed that every gross substitutes valuation is submodular. It turns
out that gross substitute functions are intimately connected to discrete convex analysis, a general
theory arising at the intersection of convex analysis and submodularity.
Murota’s book [49] gives a comprehensive treatment of this field. A central concavity concept on
the integer lattice is that ofM♮-concave functions. The definition specialized for valuation functions
(corresponding to the sublattice {−∞, 0}G) is as follows.
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Definition 2.2. The function v : 2G → R+ is an M♮-concave if for any X,Y ⊆ G and x ∈ X \ Y ,
v(X) + v(Y ) ≤ max
Z⊆Y \X,|Z|≤1
v((X \ {x}) ∪ Z) + v((Y \ Z) ∪ {x})
That is, for any x ∈ X \ Y , the sum v(X) + v(Y ) is either non-decreasing if we move x from X
to Y , or the sum is non-decreasing by swapping x for some y ∈ Y \X. As established by Fujishige
and Yang [25], these two concepts are equivalent:
Theorem 2.3 ([25]). The valuation function v : 2G → R+ is a gross substitutes valuation if and
only if it is M♮-concave.
This connection has enabled a fruitful interaction between the areas of mechanism design and
discrete convexity, see e.g. [52, 58].
Rado valuations The key class of valuation functions for this paper will be Rado valuation
functions, or Rado valuations, defined next.
Definition 2.4. Assume we are given a bipartite graph (G, V ;E) with a cost function c : E → R
on the edges, and a matroid M = (V,I). For a subset of items S ⊆ G, the Rado valuation function
v(S) is defined as the maximum cost of a matching M in (G, V ;E) such that δG(M) ⊆ S and
δV (M) ∈ I, i.e.,
v(S) := max
{∑
e∈M
c(e) :M is a matching, δG(M) ⊆ S, δV (M) ∈ I
}
. (4)
We propose to name this class in honor of Richard Rado, who first studied the independent
matching problem [59].
Let us consider the special case where the matroidM is the free matroid on V , i.e., I = 2V . In
this case, the matroid constraints δV (M) ∈ I are void. The value of a set S it then the maximum
cost matching in the bipartite subgraph induced by S ∪ V . Such valuations are called assignment
valuations by Shapley [64], and OXS valuations by Lehmann et al. [45].
As another example of Rado valuations, consider the case where V is a copy of the set of items
G, with each j ∈ G having a corresponding j′ ∈ V , and let E = {(j, j′) : j ∈ G}. Let g : G → R, and
cjj′ = gj for all j ∈ G, and let r be rank function of M. In this case the v(S) equals the weighted
matroid rank function rg(S).
Assignment valuations and weighted matroid rank functions are well-known examples of M♮-
concave (and, according to Theorem 2.3, gross substitutes) functions. We show that this is true in
general for Rado valuations.
Lemma 2.5. Every Rado valuation v : 2G → R is an M♮-concave function.
The proof is given in Section 7, using a more general construction by Murota [49]. It is worth
noting that in 2003, Frank posed the question on whether the converse is also true: is the class of
M♮-concave functions the same as those of Rado valuations?3 In Section 7.3 we use an example from
[45] showing that this is not the case. The main underlying reason is that this class is not minor
closed. We then formulate a stronger conjecture, and mention an earlier conjecture by Ostrovsky
and Paes Leme [57], partially refuted by Tran [65].
3Personal communication by Andra´s Frank. See also Kazuo Murota’s lecture [50], the problem sheet [51], and
Renato Paes Leme’s lecture [46].
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2.2 Continuous valuation functions
The valuation functions v in the Nash social welfare problem are defined on subsets of G. Our
arguments are based on convex relaxations, which requires a continuous extension of the valuation
functions to RG+. We provide such an extension for Rado valuations; however, we note that a
suitable extension does not even exist for general submodular valuations.
By a continuous valuation function we mean a continuous function v : [0, 1]G → R with v(0) = 0.
We slightly abuse the notation by using v to denote both discrete and continuous valuations; the
value of a subset S ⊆ G of items will be v(χS) = v(S). Extending notions from discrete valuations,
a function f : RG+ → R+ is monotone if f(x) ≤ f(y) for x ≤ y, x, y ∈ RG+, and subadditive if
f(x+ y) ≤ f(x) + f(y) for any x, y ∈ [0, 1]G such that x+ y ∈ [0, 1]G .
Whereas our overall result requires the continuous extension of Rado valuations, much weaker
assumptions suffice for most parts of the argument, as formulated next.
Assumption 1. For every agent i ∈ A the continuous valuation function vi : [0, 1]G → R+ is
monotone, concave, and subadditive.
Concave extensions of discrete valuations For any discrete valuation function v : 2G → R,
we can define the concave closure v¯ : [0, 1]G → R as
v¯(x) := inf
p∈RG ,α∈R
{〈p, x〉+ α : p(S) + α ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ G} , (5)
see e.g. [49, Section 3.4]. As the infimum of linear functions, v¯ is always concave. Note that it
provides the concave upper envelope of the function v defined on the discrete set {0, 1}G , meaning
that v¯ ≤ f for every concave function f : RG+ → R such that v(S) ≤ f(χS) for all S ⊆ G.
We leave it to the reader as an exercise to verify that for an additive valuation v(S) =
∑
j∈S vj ,
the concave closure is the linear function v¯(x) = 〈v, x〉.
Whereas the extension v¯ can be defined and is concave for every valuation function v, evaluating
v¯(x) can be a hard problem. For example, in the case of submodular valuations, deciding whether
p(S) + α ≥ v(S) holds for all S ⊆ G amounts to submodular maximization and is thus NP-hard.
Computing v¯(x) amounts to minimization over a polyhedron P where separation is NP-hard; by
the polynomial equivalence of optimization and separation [31], it follows that evaluating v¯(x) is
NP-hard for submodular functions (see also [36, Lemma 6.15]).
Apart from computational hardness, another problem is that v¯(χS) > v(S) may be possible for
S ⊆ G. If v¯(χS) = v(S) for all subsets S ⊆ G, then we say that v¯ is the concave extension of v, and
that v is concave extensible.
Theorem 6.43 in [49] asserts that all M♮-concave functions are concave extensible, and the
converse is also essentially true. This underlines the importance of gross substitutes/M♮-concave
valuations for our approach: this is the subclass of valuations where we can naturally use convex
relaxation techniques. We also note that for M♮-concave functions, the concave extension can
be evaluated in polynomial time. This is since, in contrast with general submodular functions,
M♮-concave functions can be efficiently maximized with a simple greedy algorithm.
The concave extension of Rado valuations For the case of Rado valuations, we now give
an explicit description of the concave extension by a linear program. This representation of the
concave extension is at the core of the arguments in Section 5, where we argue about the existence
of a sparse optimal solution of a particular convex program.
Theorem 2.6. Consider a Rado valuation v : 2G → R given by a bipartite graph (G, V ;E) with
costs on the edges c : E → R, and a matroid M = (V,I) with a rank function r = rM as in
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Definition 2.4. For x ∈ [0, 1]G , let us define
ν(x) := max
∑
(j,k)∈E
cjkzjk
s.t.:
∑
k∈V
zjk ≤ xj ∀j ∈ G
∑
j∈G,k∈T
zjk ≤ r(T ) ∀T ⊆ V
z ≥ 0 .
(6)
Then, ν = v¯ is the concave extension of v, and satisfies Assumption 1.
Proof. The function ν is clearly continuous and ν(0) = 0, thus, it is a valuation function. We
postpone the proof that ν is the concave closure, i.e. ν = v¯ to Lemma 7.2. Let us now show that
ν is a concave extension, namely ν(χS) = v(S) for every S ⊆ G. First, note that whenever M ′ is
a feasible matching in the definition of v(S), χM ′ is a feasible solution to (6) defining ν(χS). The
left hand side of the program defining ν(χS) is integral, and the feasible region of (6) is a linear
maximization problem over the intersection of two integral submodular polytopes on E. Using the
total-dual integrality of polymatroid intersection, see [63, Theorem 46.1], the existence of an integer
optimal solution z ∈ ZE is guaranteed. Noting that r({v}) ≤ 1 for every v ∈ V , it follows that
z = χM for a matching M , and δV (M) is independent in M. We conclude that ν(χS) = v(S).
Let us now turn to Assumption 1. Monotonicity is immediate. Concavity is implied by
Lemma 7.2, but let us also give a simple direct proof. Let x, y ∈ R+, λ ∈ [0, 1], and let z
and z′ be the optimal solutions in the definition of ν(x) and ν(y). Then, it is immediate that
λz + (1 − λ)z′ is a feasible solution for the program defining ν(λx + (1 − λ)y), showing that
ν(x) + ν(y) ≤ ν(λx+ (1− λ)y).
For subadditivity, if z is the optimal solution in the program defining ν(x+ y) for some x, y ∈
[0, 1]G , then we can easily decompose z = z′ + z′′ such that z′ is feasible to the program defining
ν(x) and z′′ if feasible for y. Thus, ν(x+ y) ≤ ν(x) + ν(y) follows.
In the light of this theorem, in the rest of the paper we will denote by v : [0, 1]G → R the
continuous Rado valuation defined in (6).
2.3 Simple upper bounds
We will often use the following simple bounds.
Lemma 2.7. Let n, c ∈ N, S ⊆ [n], and 1 ≤ w1, . . . , wn ≤ γ − 1. For i ∈ S let ki ∈ R+ such that∑
i∈S ki ≤ c · n. Then (∏
i∈S
kwii
)1/∑ni=1 wi
≤ c · γ .
Proof. By the (weighted) arithmetic-geometric we have:
(∏
i∈S
kwii
)1/∑ni=1 wi
=
∏
i∈S
k
wi∑n
i=1
wi
i ·
∏
i∈[n]\S
1
wi∑n
i=1
wi
≤
∑
i∈S
wiki∑n
i=1wi
+
∑
i∈[n]\S
wi∑n
i=1wi
≤ (γ − 1)
∑
i∈S ki∑n
i=1wi
+ 1 ≤ c · γ .
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Lemma 2.8. Let n, c ∈ N, S ⊆ [n]. For i ∈ S let ki ∈ R+ such that
∑
i∈S ki ≤ c · n. Then(∏
i∈S
ki
)1/n
≤ c · e1/e .
Proof. We present the proof for c = 1, the general cases easily reduces to c = 1 by scaling. Without
loss of generality, we assume that ki ≥ 1 for i ∈ S. For fixed size of S (k = |S|), the product∏
i∈S ki is maximized when all ki are the same. Hence,
(∏
i∈S ki
)1/n ≤ (nk )k/n. Let ξ = nk then(
n
k
)k/n
= ξ1/ξ. By the first order conditions, the value ξ1/ξ achieves the maximum for ξ = e. Hence,(∏
i∈S ki
)1/n ≤ e1/e.
Using the similar approach as in the proof of Lemma 2.8, one can replace the bound(∏
i∈S k
wi
i
)1/∑ni=1 wi ≤ c · γ in Lemma 2.7 by the bound (∏i∈S kwii )1/∑ni=1 wi ≤ c · O ( γlog(γ)).
This proof is deferred to Section 8, and the exact bound given there is always stronger than in
Lemma 2.7. Moreover, trivially we have
(∏
i∈S k
wi
i
)1/∑ni=1 wi ≤ c ·n. Nevertheless, we will use only
use Lemma 2.7 for the asymmetric, and Lemma 2.8 for the symmetric version of the problem in
rest of the paper.
3 Overview of the approach
Let vi be a continuous valuation function and wi > 0 be the weight for each i ∈ A. Given a
fractional allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RA×G+ , we let
NSW(x) :=
(∏
i∈A
vi(xi)
wi
)1/∑i wi
.
Then, the asymmetric Nash social welfare program is captured by the following integer program.
maxNSW(x) s.t.
∑
i∈A
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ G, x ∈ {0, 1}E . (NSW-IP)
Let OPT denote the optimum value. The natural relaxation is (NSW-IP) is
maxNSW(x) s.t.
∑
i∈A
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ G, x ≥ 0 . (7)
The objective is log-concave assuming the vi’s are concave functions. However, Cole and Gkatzelis
[17, Lemma 3.1] showed that this relaxation has unbounded integrality gap already for additive
valuations.
We propose a mixed integer programming relaxation instead of (7). Consider a set of items
H ⊆ G. Our mixed relaxation requires the items in H to be allocated integrally and the rest can
be allocated fractionally.
max NSW(x)
s.t.:
∑
i∈A
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ G
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ H,∀i ∈ A
x ≥ 0 .
(Mixed relaxation)
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This clearly gives a relaxation of (NSW-IP): OPTH ≥ OPT where OPTH is optimal value
of (Mixed relaxation) for any set of items H. Theorem 1.2 is shown by constructing an integer
allocation x ∈ {0, 1}A×G and an item set H such that NSW(x) ≥ OPTH /(256γ3). This is proved
in five phases:
Phase I Find an appropriate item set H.
Phase II Approximate (Mixed relaxation) by another integer program (Mixed+matching).
Phase III Find an approximate mixed integer solution to (Mixed+matching).
Phase IV Find a sparse approximate mixed integer solution to (Mixed+matching).
Phase V Round the mixed integer solution to an integer solution.
We note that phases are not necessarily algorithmic phases but also conceptional reductions of the
problem. Regardless, we call it a phase for the simplicity of the presentation. We now give an
overview of all the phases; most proofs are deferred to later sections.
3.1 Phase I: Finding the item set H
We solve a maximum weight matching problem that achieves the highest Nash social welfare value
under the restriction that each agent may only receive a single item. This can be achieved by
assigning an edge weight ωij = wi log(vij) for every i ∈ A, j ∈ G, and solving the maximum weight
assignment problem in the complete bipartite graph between A and G; we recall the notation
vij = vi({j}). We let τ : A → G denote the optimal matching represented as a mapping, i.e. τ(i) is
the item matched to agent i ∈ A. We define H as the set of items assigned by τ , i.e., H := τ(A).
We will refer to this set H as the set of most preferred items.4
The existence of τ with finite weight proves that the instance is feasible, i.e., there is a way of
allocating one item to each agent such that agent values the assigned item positively. On the other
hand, if no finite weight matching exists, the optimum value to (NSW-IP) is 0. Henceforth, we
assume without loss of generality that the optimal NSW is non-zero.
3.2 Phase II: Reduction to the mixed matching relaxation
We approximate (Mixed relaxation) by a second mixed integer program. We use variables y ∈
RA×(G\H) representing the fractional allocations of the items in G \ H. Even though the valuation
functions vi are defined on R
G, we use vi(yi) to denote vi(xi), where xi is obtained from yi by
setting xij = 0 for j ∈ H and xij = yij for j ∈ G \ H.
max
(∏
i∈A
(
vi(yi) + viσ(i)
)wi)1/
∑
i wi
s.t.:
∑
i∈A
yij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ G \ H
yij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ G \ H,∀i ∈ A
σ : A → H is a matching.
(Mixed+matching)
We will refer to this program as the mixed matching relaxation. The program (Mixed+matching)
differs from (Mixed relaxation) in two respects. Firstly, the objective differs from NSW(x): for
4 Interestingly, in case of symmetric agents endowed with additive valuations the set H contains all items with
price at least one in any spending restricted equilibrium as in [17]; see Section 9.
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each agent, we evaluate the utility of each agent separately on H and G \ H. Secondly, and more
importantly, we require that the items in H are allocated to the agents by a matching. Unlike
(Mixed relaxation), this will not be a relaxation of (NSW-IP): the optimal integer solution may
allocate multiple items in H to the same agent. We show that the effect of both these changes is
limited.
Let (y, σ) be a feasible solution to (Mixed+matching). We define NSW(y, σ) as the objective
function value in (Mixed+matching), and let OPTH denote the optimum value. Let us define
NSW(y, σ) as the Nash social welfare of the same allocation. Namely, NSW(y, σ) = NSW(x),
where xij = yij if j ∈ G \H, and for j ∈ H we have xij = 1 if j = σ(i), and xij = 0 otherwise. The
next lemma is an easy consequence of concavity and subadditivity.
Lemma 3.1. For any feasible solution (y, σ) to (Mixed+matching), we have
NSW(y, σ) ≥ NSW(y, σ) ≥ 1
2
NSW(y, σ) .
Using this lemma, as well as Lemma 2.7, we can relate the optimum values and approximate
solutions of (Mixed relaxation) and (Mixed+matching).
Theorem 3.2. Let H ⊆ G with |H| ≤ |A|. For the optimum values OPTH to (Mixed relaxation)
and OPTH to (Mixed+matching), we have
OPTH ≥ 1
γ
OPTH .
Let (y, σ) be an α-approximate optimal solution to (Mixed+matching), that is, NSW(y, σ) ≥
1
αOPTH. Then, NSW(y, σ) ≥ 12αγ OPTH. If the valuation functions vi are additive, then the
stronger bound NSW(y, σ) ≥ 1αγ OPTH applies.
Proof. We first show that OPTH ≥ 1γ OPTH. Let x be an optimal solution to (Mixed relaxation).
For each agent i, let Ki be the set of items agent i receives from H under x; and let y be the
restriction of x on G \ H defined as yij = xij for j ∈ G \ H and yij = 0 otherwise. Let ki := |Ki|.
Denote with S the set of agents that receive at least one items from H, i.e., S = {i ∈ A : ki ≥ 1}.
For each agent i ∈ S let σ(i) = maxj∈Ki{vij}, and define σ(i) = ∅ for i ∈ A \ S. Then, (y, σ) is a
feasible solution of (Mixed+matching). In other words, (y, σ) is obtained from x once each agent
i ∈ S discards all items from Ki except the most valuable one. By monotonicity and subadditivity,
for all i ∈ S, we have
vi(xi) ≤ vi(y) +
∑
j∈Ki
vij ≤ ki · (vi(y) + viσ(i)) .
Therefore,
OPTH
OPTH
≤ NSW(x)
NSW(y, σ)
=
(∏
i∈S
vi(xi)
wi
(vi(y) + viσ(i))wi
)1/∑i wi
≤
(∏
i∈S
kwii
)1/∑i wi
.
Moreover,
∑
i∈S ki ≤ |H| ≤ |A| = n. Then, the bound follows by Lemma 2.7. The second part of
the theorem follows by Lemma 3.1.
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3.3 Phase III: Approximating the mixed matching relaxation
Our next goal is to find a 2-approximation solution to (Mixed+matching); we do not know whether
this problem is polynomial-time solvable. By Theorem 3.2, this yields a (4γ)-approximation to
(Mixed relaxation).
Let us first remove all items in H. Some agents may only value positively the items H. We
let A′ the subset of agents who have positive values for the items G \ H, that is, A′ := {i ∈ A :
vi(G \H) > 0}. Consider the “na¨ıve” relaxation (7) on the instance restricted to A′ and G \H, and
taking the logarithm of the objective
max
∑
i∈A
wi log(vi(yi))
s.t.:
∑
i∈A′
yij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ G \ H
y ≥ 0.
(EG)
This is the classical Eisenberg–Gale convex program that computes an equilibrium in Fisher
markets with divisible items for homogeneous concave valuation functions [22]. Given an optimal
solution y∗ ∈ RA′×(G\H)+ of (EG) we can find an approximate solution to (Mixed+matching).
Theorem 3.3. Let H ⊆ G with |H| ≤ |A|. Let π∗ be maximum weight assignment in the complete
bipartite graph between A and H, with edge weights ωij = wi log (vi(y∗i ) + vij) for i ∈ A, j ∈ H.
Then, NSW(y∗, π∗) ≥ 12OPTH.
Theorem 3.3 is an immediate consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Let H ⊆ G with |H| ≤ |A|. Let α > 0 and y∗ be an optimal and y a feasible solution
of (EG) such that vi(yi) ≥ 1αvi(y∗i ) for all i ∈ A′. Let π be maximum weight assignment in the
bipartite graph with colour classes A and H, and edge weights ωij = wi log (vi(yi) + vij) for i ∈ A,
j ∈ H. Then,
NSW(y, π) ≥ 1
2α
OPTH .
Since valuations vi are concave, (EG) is a convex program. For any ε > 0, we can find an
(1 − ε)-approximate solution in polynomial-time, where the running time depends on log(1/ε). It
turns out that approximation of the objective function might not be enough. In Lemma 3.4 we
require an agent-wise approximate solution: each agent gets at least a constant fraction of her value
in the optimum. It is not clear if finding such agent-wise approximation is possible in polynomial
time for general concave valuations vi, but as we will see in the next section we can find an exact
optimal solution for Rado valuations.
The proof of Lemma 3.4 is deferred to Section 4. It does not depend on the choice of H but
only requires |H| ≤ |A|.
3.4 Phase IV: A sparse approximate solution for the mixed matching relaxation
In this section we exploit the properties of Rado valuations. Assuming the agents have Rado
valuation functions, we can find an approximate solution of (Mixed+matching) with a strong
sparsity property. Even though the approximation ratio is weaker then given in Theorem 3.3,
sparsity will be essential for the rounding in Phase V.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose the functions vi are Rado valuations. Let H ⊆ G with |H| ≤ |A|. We can
find a feasible solution (y, π) to (Mixed+matching) such that
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(i) NSW(y, π) ≥ 14OPTH,
(ii) supp(y) ≤ 2|A| + |L+| where L+ = {j ∈ G \ H : ∑i∈A′ yij > 0}, that is, L+ is the set of
allocated items in y.
Moreover, for additive valuation functions, we can strengthen (i) to NSW(y, σ) ≥ 12 OPTH and (ii)
to supp(y) ≤ |A|+ |L+|.
Let us start with the special case of additive valuations. In this case, an exact solution y∗ to
the Eisenberg–Gale convex program (EG) can be found in strongly polynomial time [56, 68].
Theorem 3.6. Assuming the valuations vi are additive, we can find an optimal solution y
∗ of (EG)
in strongly polynomial time such that the support supp(y∗) is a forest.
The claim on the support follows easily by showing that any cycles in supp(y∗) can be eliminated,
see e.g., [17, 21, 56]. Consequently, |supp(y∗)| ≤ |A′| + |L+| − 1. Together with Lemma 3.4, this
proves the statement in Theorem 3.5 for additive valuations.
For Rado valuations, we first prove that an optimal solution of (EG) can be found in polynomial
time, see Section 5.1. We first show that this is a rational convex program, and use the variant of
the ellipsoid method for rational polyhedra [31].
Lemma 3.7. Suppose that for each agent i ∈ A, vi is a Rado valuation given by a bipartite
graph (G, Vi;Ei), integer costs ci : Ei → Z and a matroid Mi = (Vi,Ii) as in Definition 2.4. Let
T = maxi∈A |Vi|, and C = maxi∈A ‖ci‖∞. Let the weights wi > 0 be rational numbers given as
quotients of two integers at most U . Assume the matroids Mi are given by rank oracles. Then,
(EG) has a rational solution with poly(|A|, |G|, T, log C, logU) bit-complexity, and such a solution
can be found in poly(|A|, |G|, T, log C, logU) arithmetic operations and calls to the matroid rank
oracles.
Our next lemma shows that any feasible solution to (EG) can be sparsified by losing at most
the half of the value for each agent, see Section 5.2. This is achieved in two steps, using the sparsity
of basic feasible solutions to linear programs. Half of the valuation may be lost in the second step,
where for the fractionally allocated items we aim to remove one of the fractional edges. The set to
be deleted is identified by writing an auxiliary linear program.
Lemma 3.8. Suppose the functions vi are Rado valuations, and let yˆ be a feasible solution to (EG).
Then, in polynomial time we can find a feasible solution y such that
(i) vi(y) ≥ 12vi(yˆ),
(ii) |supp(y)| ≤ 2|A′|+ |L+| where L+ := L+(y) = {j ∈ G \ H :∑i∈A′ yij > 0}.
By combining Lemmas 3.4, 3.7, 3.8, we obtain Theorem 3.5 for Rado valuations.
3.5 Phase V: Rounding the mixed integer solution
For this phase of the algorithm, we require a sparse approximate solution as in Theorem 3.5, and
exploit the choice of H as the set of most preferred items in Phase I. We start with a mixed integer
solution (y, π) as in Theorem 3.5. By a reduction of (y, π) we mean a mixed integer solution (yr, π)
obtained as follows. For each j ∈ L+, we pick an arbitrary agent κ(j) ∈ A such that yκ(j)j > 0. We
set yrκ(j)j = yκ(j)j , and set y
r
ij = 0 if i 6= κ(j). By the bound on supp(y), this amounts to setting
≤ 2|A| values yij to 0. The proof of the next lemma is given in Section 6.
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Lemma 3.9. Let H be the set of most preferred items, and let (y, π) be a solution to (Mixed+matching)
as in Theorem 3.5. Let (yr, π) be a reduction of (y, π). Then in polynomial-time we can find a
matching ρ : A → H such that
NSW(yr, ρ) ≥ 1
32γ2
NSW(y, π) .
Further, if the valuations are linear, then we can find a matching ρ : A → H such that NSW(yr, ρ) ≥
1
8NSW(y, π).
Such a matching ρ can be found by combining the matching π in the solution (y, π), and the
initial matching τ from Phase I that delivers the highest NSW value such that every agent may
receive only one item. We swap from π to τ on certain alternating cycles.
We are ready to prove the main results.
Theorem 1.2 (Main). There exists a polynomial-time 256γ3-approximation algorithm for the Nash
social welfare problem with Rado valuation functions. For additive valuation functions, there exists
a polynomial-time 16γ-approximation algorithm.5
Proof. From Theorem 3.5 and Lemma 3.9, we can obtain a solution an (128γ2)-approximate solution
(yr, ρ) to (Mixed+matching) such that for each item L+ there is exactly one incident edge in
supp(yr). We can obtain a 0–1 valued solution x to (NSW-IP) by assigning each item inH according
to ρ and each item j ∈ L+ to the unique agent i with yrij > 0. Clearly, NSW(x) ≥ NSW(yr, ρ). We
obtain NSW(x) ≥ OPTH /(256γ3) ≥ OPT /(256γ3) using Theorem 3.2. For additive valuations,
we use the stronger bounds in the same results.
Theorem 1.1. There exists a polynomial-time 256e3/e≈772-approximation algorithm for the sym-
metric Nash social welfare problem under Rado valuations.
Proof. The proof follows exactly as the proof of Theorem 1.2 once we replace γ by e1/e. Such a
change is justified as in the symmetric case we can use Lemma 2.8 instead of the bound given by
Lemma 2.7.
4 Phase III: Approximating the mixed matching relaxation
Phase III presents a general way of obtaining a 2-approximation to (Mixed+matching). By The-
orem 3.2, this gives a (4γ)-approximation to (Mixed relaxation), a mixed integer relaxation of the
ANSW problem. Recall that (Mixed+matching) is the following mixed integer program
max
(∏
i∈A
(
vi(yi) + viσ(i)
)wi)1/
∑
i wi
s.t.:
∑
i∈A
yij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ G \ H
yij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ G \ H,∀i ∈ A
σ : A → H is a matching.
(Mixed+matching)
In the above problem, we need to allocate items G to the agents in A in order to maximize
an objective function that is an approximation of the NSW. Items in G \ H can be allocated
5We note that γ in the theorem can be replaced by min
{
O
(
γ
log γ
)
, n
}
as we show in Section 2.3 and Section 8.
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fractionally to the agents without any constraints. The items in H have to be allocated integrally
via an assignment, thereby allocating exactly one item from H to each agent A.
While the exact computational complexity of (Mixed+matching) remains unresolved, we show
that we can 2-approximate it.
Denote L = G \ H. Let A′ be the subset of agents that have positive value for the items in
G \ H, A′ := {i ∈ A : vi(G \ H) > 0}, as some agents may only have positive value for the items in
H. Restricting (Mixed+matching) to the items L and agents A′ and taking the objective yields an
instance of (EG):
max
∑
i∈A′
wi log vi(yi)
s.t.:
∑
i∈A′
yij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ L
yij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ L,∀i ∈ A′.
The above is a convex program whenever the valuations vi(.) are concave, and we can solve it to an
arbitrary precision in polynomial time if we have access to a supergradient oracle to the objective
function.
On the other hand, suppose that the variables y are fixed in (Mixed+matching). Under the
fixed y, we can find an optimal assignment σ. Namely, an optimal assignment is exactly a maximum
weight assignment in the bipartite graph (A,H;E) where the weight of an edge ij for i ∈ A, j ∈ H
is ωij := wi log(vi(yi) + vij).
Informally, (Mixed+matching) is a combination of two tractable problems. We show that an
optimal solution y∗ to the restriction of the problem to L and A′, and an optimal assignment with
respect to the fixed y∗ gives a 2-approximation for (Mixed+matching).
In Section 4.1 we discuss the restriction of the problem to L and A′ and give a technical lemma.
The main result of the section is presented in Section 4.2.
4.1 Properties of Eisenberg–Gale program
Let us now consider the Eisenberg–Gale program (EG). An optimal solution y∗ and the optimal
Lagrange multipliers pj for j ∈ L can be interpreted as the so-called Gale equilibrium in the market
with divisible items L, agents A′, and where agent i has valuation vi and budget wi. In particular,
y∗ represent the allocations and pj for j ∈ L, specify the prices in the market equilibrium, see
e.g., [28, 54].6
Our technical lemma relates the combined difference in valuations of each agent in the optimal
solution y∗ and any other allocation y′. The rest of Section 4.1 is devoted to its proof.
Lemma 4.1. Let y∗ be an optimal solution to (EG). Then for any feasible solution y′ and any
A′′ ⊆ A′ it holds ∑
i∈A′′
wi
vi(y
′
i)
vi(y∗i )
≤
∑
i∈A′′
wi +
∑
i∈A′
wi .
We recall some definitions and the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions in terms
of subgradients; see [62, Chapter 2 and Theorem 3.27]. Given a convex function f : RM → R, we
say that g is a subgradient of h at y∗ ∈ RM if f(y) ≥ f(y∗) + g⊤(y − y∗) for all y ∈ RM . The set
of all subgradients at a point y∗ is called subdifferential and denoted as ∂f(y∗). If the function is
6 In case of homogeneous valuations this can be used to find a Fisher equilibrium, since Fisher and Gale equilibria
coincide under homogeneous valuations [23, 54].
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differentiable then ∂f(y∗) = {∇f(y∗)}. Consider the convex program
min f0(y)
s.t.: fj(y) ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ L
y ≥ 0 ,
where fj for j ∈ {0} ∪ L is convex. Assume that the there exists a strict feasible point (Slater’s
condition). Then, y∗ is a an optimal solution with the Lagrange multipliers p, if and only if the
following conditions hold
• fj(y∗) ≤ 0, pj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ L (primal and dual feasibility),
• 0 ∈ ∂f0(y∗) +
∑
j∈L pj∂fj(y
∗) + {µ ∈ RM− : µ⊤y∗ = 0} (stationarity), and
• pjfj(y∗) = 0 (complementary slackness).
We say that g is a supergradient of the concave function f if −g is a subgradient of −f . The
following proposition guarantees the existence of supergradients.
Proposition 4.2. The function f : RM+ → R is concave if and only if ∀y∗ ∈ RM+ it has a non-empty
superdifferential at y∗. In other words, there is g ∈ RM such that
f(y) ≤ f(y∗) + g⊤(y − y∗) .
We can interpret the Lagrange multipliers in (EG) as prices; the next claim states that no agent
spends more that her budget in a Gale–equilibrium.
Claim 4.3. Let y∗ be an optimum and p be the optimal Lagrange multipliers of (EG). For all
i ∈ A′ it holds p⊤y∗i ≤ wi.
Proof. Let us apply the above KKT conditions to the concave maximization program (EG). for
each agent i ∈ A′
0 ∈ ∂ (−wi log(vi(y∗i ))) + p+ {µi ∈ RL− : µ⊤i y∗i = 0} .
By the composition rules for subgradients we have
0 ∈ −wi∂vi(y
∗
i )
vi(y
∗
i )
+ p+ {µi ∈ RL− : µ⊤i y∗i = 0} .
Therefore, there exists a supergradient gi ∈ ∂vi(y∗i ) such that wig⊤i = vi(y∗i ) · (p⊤ + µ⊤i ) where
µi ≤ 0 and µ⊤i y∗i = 0.
By definition of subgradient (supergradient) at y∗i , we have that g
⊤
i y
∗
i ≤ vi(y∗i ) for all i ∈ A′.
It follows that p⊤y∗i ≤ wi for all i ∈ A′.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. By the KKT conditions, for each i ∈ A′, we have a supergradient gi ∈ ∂vi(y∗i )
such that wigivi(y∗i )
≤ p holds. By complementarity slackness, if pj > 0 then
∑
i∈A′ y
∗
ij = 1. Let
yij = max{y∗ij, y′ij}. Then we obtain:
vi(y
′
i) ≤ vi(yi) ≤ vi(y∗i ) + g⊤i (yi − y∗i ) ≤ vi(y∗i ) +
vi(y
∗
i )p
⊤
wi
· (yi − y∗i ) .
The first inequality is by monotonicity, the second by the definition of the supergradient, and
the third from the KKT conditions as noted above. After rearranging we obtain
wivi(y
′
i)
vi(y
∗
i )
≤
18
wi + p
⊤(yi − y∗i ). Summing the previous inequality for each agent i ∈ A′′ for a subset A′′ ⊆ A′,
and by definition of yi, we have
∑
i∈A′′
wivi(y
′
i)
vi(y∗i )
≤
∑
i∈A′′
wi +
∑
i∈A′′
p⊤(yi − y∗i ) ≤
∑
i∈A′′
wi + p
⊤
1 .
Since pj > 0 implies
∑
i∈A′ y
∗
ij = 1 we have that p
⊤
1 = p⊤
∑
i∈A′ y
∗
i . Then, by Claim 4.3 we have
∑
i∈A′′
wi
vi(y
′
i)
vi(y
∗
i )
≤
∑
i∈A′′
wi +
∑
i∈A′
wi
4.2 The approximation guarantee for the mixed matching relaxation
Lemma 3.4. Let H ⊆ G with |H| ≤ |A|. Let α > 0 and y∗ be an optimal and y a feasible solution
of (EG) such that vi(yi) ≥ 1αvi(y∗i ) for all i ∈ A′. Let π be maximum weight assignment in the
bipartite graph with colour classes A and H, and edge weights ωij = wi log (vi(yi) + vij) for i ∈ A,
j ∈ H. Then,
NSW(y, π) ≥ 1
2α
OPTH .
Proof. Let π∗ be maximum weight matching in the bipartite graph with colour classes A and H
and with edge weights q∗i = wi log(vi(y
∗) + vij). Equivalently, π
∗ is a matching maximizing
(∏
i∈A′
(
vi(y
∗
i ) + viπ∗(i)
)wi)1/
∑
i∈A wi
.
We have the bounds
NSW(y, π) ≥ NSW(y, π∗) ≥ 1
α
NSW(y∗, π∗) . (8)
The first inequality is by the definition of π as the maximum weight matching. The second inequality
follows from the assumption vi(yi) ≥ 1αvi(y∗i ) for each i ∈ A′.
The rest of the proof is devoted to proving that NSW(y∗, π∗) ≥ 12OPTH; together with (8),
this implies the statement. Let us introduce some notation. For an agent i ∈ A, let Y ∗i =
vi(y
∗
i ) be the value agent i gets from the optimal fractional bundle y
∗. Then, NSW(y∗, π∗) =(∏
i∈A′(Y
∗
i + viπ∗(i))
wi
∏
i∈A\A′ v
wi
iπ∗(i)
)1/∑i∈A wi
.
Let (y′, ̺) be an optimal solution achieving OPTH. For an agent i ∈ A let Yi = vi(y′i)
be the value agent i gets from the fractional allocation y′. Then OPTH = NSW(y
′, ̺) =(∏
i∈A(Yi + vi̺(i))
wi
)1/∑i∈A wi . By definition of the set A′, the agents in A \ A′ do not value
the items in L. Thus, by monotonicity
NSW(y′, ̺) =

∏
i∈A′
(Yi + vi̺(i))
wi
∏
i∈A\A′
vwii̺(i)


1/
∑
i∈A wi
.
By the choice of π∗, we have
NSW(y∗, π∗) ≥ NSW(y∗, ̺) =

∏
i∈A′
(Y ∗i + vi̺(i))
wi
∏
i∈A\A′
vwii̺(i)


1/
∑
i∈A wi
.
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Combining the last two we have:
NSW(y′, ̺)
NSW(y∗, π∗)
≤
(∏
i∈A′
(
Yi + vi̺(i)
Y ∗i + vi̺(i)
)wi)1/∑i∈A wi
.
Let A′′ = {i ∈ A′ : Yi > Y ∗i } be the set of agents that get more value from y′ than y∗. Then,
for i ∈ A′ \A′′ the fraction Yi + vi̺(i)
Y ∗i + vi̺(i)
is trivially bounded by 1. On the other hand, for i ∈ A′′ we
have
Yi + vi̺(i)
Y ∗i + vi̺(i)
≤ Yi
Y ∗i
. Since OPTH = NSW(y
′, ̺) it follows
OPTH
NSW(y∗, π∗)
≤
(∏
i∈A′
(
Yi + vi̺(i)
Y ∗i + vi̺(i)
)wi)1/∑i∈A wi
≤
(∏
i∈A′′
(
Yi
Y ∗i
)wi)1/∑i∈Awi
.
We claim that the last expression is bounded by 2. By Lemma 4.1 we have
∑
i∈A′′ wi
Yi
Y ∗i
≤∑
i∈A′′ wi +
∑
i∈A′ wi. Then by the weighted arithmetic-geometric mean we have
∏
i∈A′′
(
Yi
Y ∗i
)wi/∑i∈A wi
≤
∑
i∈A′′ wi
Yi
Y ∗i
+
∑
i∈A\A′′ 1∑
i∈A wi
≤
∑
i∈A′′ wi +
∑
i∈A′ wi + |A \ A′′|∑
i∈Awi
≤ 2 .
The lemma follows.
5 Phase IV: Obtaining a sparse approximate solution
Recall that a continuous Rado valuation is defined as an optimum of the LP (6). For the valuation
vi of agent i ∈ A, this is defined by a bipartite graph (G, Vi;Ei) with costs on the edges ci : Ei → R,
and a matroidMi = (Vi,Ii) with a rank function ri = rMi . The program (EG) for A′ and L = G\H
can be thus written as follows.
max
∑
i∈A′
wi log

∑
j∈L
∑
k∈Vi
cijkzijk


s.t.:
∑
i∈A′
yij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ L
∑
k∈Vi
zijk ≤ yij ∀i ∈ A′,∀j ∈ L
∑
j∈L
∑
k∈S
zijk ≤ ri(S) ∀i ∈ A′,∀S ⊆ Vi
y ≥ 0 , z ≥ 0 .
Without loss of generality we can assume that the second set of constraints always holds with equal-
ity, i.e., yij =
∑
k∈Vi
zijk for j ∈ L and i ∈ A′. By eliminating the variables y, the program (EG)
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becomes:
max
∑
i∈A′
wi log

∑
j∈L
∑
k∈Vi
cijkzijk


s.t.:
∑
i∈A′
∑
k∈Vi
zijk ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ L
∑
j∈L
∑
k∈S
zijk ≤ ri(S) ∀i ∈ A′,∀S ⊆ Vi
z ≥ 0 ,
(EG-Rado)
Using this formulation, we first show that the Eisenberg–Gale type convex program (EG) can be
solved exactly in polynomial time for Rado valuations (Section 5.1). We then transform the optimal
solution to a sparse approximate solution (Section 5.2).
5.1 Solving the Eisenberg-Gale relaxation
In this section, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.7. Suppose that for each agent i ∈ A, vi is a Rado valuation given by a bipartite
graph (G, Vi;Ei), integer costs ci : Ei → Z and a matroid Mi = (Vi,Ii) as in Definition 2.4. Let
T = maxi∈A |Vi|, and C = maxi∈A ‖ci‖∞. Let the weights wi > 0 be rational numbers given as
quotients of two integers at most U . Assume the matroids Mi are given by rank oracles. Then,
(EG) has a rational solution with poly(|A|, |G|, T, log C, logU) bit-complexity, and such a solution
can be found in poly(|A|, |G|, T, log C, logU) arithmetic operations and calls to the matroid rank
oracles.
As noted above, (EG) with Rado valuations for the set of agents A′ and set of goods L is
equivalent to (EG-Rado). Throughout, we assume this program is feasible, i.e. it has a solution
with finite objective value. This is a mild condition only requiring the existence of at least one edge
(j, k) ∈ Ei with cijk > 0 and ri({k}) = 1 for every i ∈ A′.
In general, one can only expect to solve convex programs approximately: no rational solution
may even exist. Vazirani [67] defines rational convex programs where a finite optimum exists
with bounded bit-complexity in the input size, where the input is described by a finite set of
parameters. This model is not directly applicable for our program (EG-Rado) as it is described
with an exponential number of constraints. The bound poly(|A|, |G|, T, log C, logU) does not take
into account the matroidal constraints; it is polynomial in the amount of information needed to
describe the objective function.7
We first show that the set of optimal solutions is a polytope where the vertices have polynomially
bounded bit-complexity.
Lemma 5.1. For an NSW problem instance with Rado valuations as in Lemma 3.7, the set of
optimal solutions forms a polytope. The bit-complexity of each vertex of this polytope is bounded as
poly(|A|, |G|, T, log C, logU).
To prove the above lemma we use the KKT conditions for (EG-Rado). Let pj’s and αi(S)’s
denote the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the first and second sets of the constraints,
respectively. It holds:
7We note that for exponential size linear programs, a standard way to bound the encoding size is giving bounds
on facet/vertex-complexity, defined later in this section. The program (EG-Rado) maximizes a concave function over
a polytope that has facet complexity O(|A|T ).
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(i) ∀j ∈ L : pj ≥ 0.
(ii) ∀i ∈ A′,∀S ⊆ Vi : αi(S) ≥ 0.
(iii) ∀j ∈ L : pj > 0 =⇒
∑
i∈A′,k∈Vi
zijk = 1.
(iv) ∀i ∈ A′,∀S ⊆ Vi : αi(S) > 0 =⇒
∑
j∈L,k∈S
zijk = ri(S).
(v) ∀i ∈ A′,∀j ∈ L,∀k ∈ Vi : cijk
pj +
∑
S:k∈S αi(S)
≤
∑
j∈L,k′∈Vi
cijk′zijk′
wi
.
(vi) ∀i ∈ A′,∀j ∈ L : zijk > 0 =⇒ cijk
pj +
∑
S:k∈S αi(S)
=
∑
j∈L,k∈Vi
cijk′zijk′
wi
.
In (v) and (vi), we have divided the conditions by pj+
∑
S:k∈S αi(S) and multiplied by
∑
j∈L,k′∈Vi
cijk′zijk′ .
By the feasibility assumption, both these must be positive.
We say that (p, α) are optimal Lagrange multipliers if they satisfy (i)–(vi) together with any
optimal solution z to (EG-Rado).
Claim 5.2. There exists an optimal solution z with optimal Lagrange multipliers (p, α) with the
following property: for every agent i ∈ A′, the support of the vector αi is a chain of sets S(i)1 ⊂
· · · ⊂ S(i)hi ⊆ Vi for some hi ∈ N.
Proof of Claim. We use a standard uncrossing argument. Let z be an optimal solution to (EG-Rado).
Let us consider the set of optimal Lagrange multipliers (p, α). For a fixed z, the set of vectors (p, α)
satisfying the constraints (i)–(vi) forms a polytope, since each constraint can be equivalently writ-
ten as a linear constraint, and (iii), (iv), and (vi) imply boundedness. Thus, there exists a solution
(p, α) that maximizes the objective
ϕ(p, α) :=
∑
i∈A′
∑
S⊆Vi
|S|2αi(S) .
We claim that such a solution satisfies the conditions. This follows by showing that for each i ∈ A′,
if αi(X), αi(Y ) > 0 then either X ⊆ Y or Y ⊆ X.
For a contradiction, assume X \ Y, Y \ X 6= ∅, and let ε := min{αi(X), αi(Y )} > 0. Let us
define α′ as follows:
• α′i(X ∪ Y ) = αi(X ∪ Y ) + ε;
• α′(X) = α(X) − ε and α′(Y ) = α(Y )− ε;
• if X ∩ Y 6= ∅, then α′i(X ∩ Y ) = αi(X ∩ Y ) + ε;
• if S /∈ {X,Y,X ∪ Y,X ∩ Y } then α′i(S) = αi(S); and
• if j 6= i then α′j(S) = αj(S) for all S.
We claim that (p, α′) are also optimal Lagrange multipliers. This gives a contradiction, since
ϕ(p, α′) > ϕ(p, α). Constraints (i)–(iii) are immediate. Constraints (v) and (vi) follow since
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∑
S:k∈S α
′
i(S) =
∑
S:k∈S αi(S) holds for all i ∈ A′ and all k ∈ Vi. Finally, (iv) follows by observing
that for any i ∈ A′ and any j ∈ L,∑
j∈L,k∈X
zijk +
∑
j∈L,k∈Y
zijk = ri(X) + ri(Y ) ≥ ri(X ∪ Y ) + ri(X ∩ Y )
≥
∑
j∈L,k∈X∩Y
zijk +
∑
j∈L,k∈X∪Y
zijk =
∑
j∈L,k∈X
zijk +
∑
j∈L,k∈Y
zijk ,
using the submodularity of ri. We must have equality throughout, implying (iv) for S = X ∪ Y
and S = X ∩ Y . 
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Let z be any optimal solution to (EG-Rado) and let (p, α) be any optimal
Lagrange multipliers as in Claim 5.2, with αi supported on the chain S
(i)
1 ⊂ S(i)2 ⊂ . . . ⊂ S(i)hi .
Let L′ ⊆ L be the subset of goods with pj > 0, and let E′i ⊆ Ei be the set of edges (j, k) for
which cijk/(pj +
∑
S:k∈S αi(S)) is maximized. Clearly, zijk > 0 only if (j, k) ∈ E′i.
We perform the following variable substitution:
qj :=
1
pj
∀j ∈ L, and Q(i)jt :=
1
pj +
∑hi
b=t αi
(
S
(i)
b
) ∀i ∈ A′, ∀t ∈ [hi] . (9)
We show that, provided the supports L′, E′i, we can define a linear program in the variables
qj’s, Q
(i)
jt ’s, and zijk as follows. We include all feasibility constraints on zijk from (EG-Rado) and
the following additional constraints:∑
i∈A′,k∈Vi
zijk = 1 ∀j ∈ L′
∑
j∈L,k∈S
zijk = ri(S) ∀i ∈ A′,∀S ⊆ Vi
wicijkQ
(i)
jt ≤
∑
j∈L,k′∈Vi
cijk′zijk′ ∀i ∈ A′,∀(j, k) ∈ Ei, and t s.t. k ∈ S(i)t \ S(i)t−1
wicijkQ
(i)
jt =
∑
j∈L,k′∈Vi
cijk′zijk′ ∀i ∈ A′,∀(j, k) ∈ E′i, and t s.t. k ∈ S(i)t \ S(i)t−1
Q
(i)
jt ≤ Q(i)j(t+1) ∀i ∈ A′, j ∈ L′, t ∈ [hi − 1]
qj = 0 ∀j ∈ L \ L′
zijk = 0 ∀i ∈ A′, (j, k) ∈ Ei \ E′i
Q, q ≥ 0
Let P ∈ R(
∑
i∈A′ |Ei|)×L
′×(
∑
j∈F ′ hi) be the set of feasible solutions to this LP. According to (i)–(vi),
(z, q,Q) ∈ P , where (q,Q) is obtained from (p, α) as in (9). Conversely, if (z′, q′, Q′) ∈ P , then we
can map (q′, Q′) to a nonnegative (p′, α′) such that (9) holds and (z′, p′, α′) satisfy (i)–(vi).
Since all coefficients in the system are rational numbers from the input, and the feasible region
P is bounded, it follows that P is a polytope where all basic feasible solutions are rational vectors
with encoding size polynomially bounded in the input.
Let us fix (q′, Q′) in a basic feasible solution, and let P ′′ = {z′′ : (z′′, q′, Q′) ∈ P}. Then, z′′ ∈ P ′′
if and only if z′′ is optimal with respect to (EG-Rado). Further, P ′′ is a polytope defined by linear
constraints with polynomially bounded coefficients. Thus, the claim follows.
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The Ellipsoid Method for Rational Polyhedra We quickly recall some relevant concepts for
the Ellipsoid Method from the book [31] by Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz, and Schrijver. A strong separation
oracle for the convex set K ⊆ Rn takes as input a vector x ∈ Rn, and either returns the answer
x ∈ K, or returns a vector a ∈ Rn such that 〈a, x〉 > max{〈a, z〉 : z ∈ K}.
Let us recall the definitions of facet and vertex complexity. We only include the definitions for
polytopes, instead of general polyhedra.
Definition 5.3 ([31, Definition (6.2.2)]). Let P ⊆ Rn be a polytope.
1. We say that P has facet-complexity at most ϕ, if P can be defined by a system of linear
inequalities with rational coefficients such that each inequality has encoding length at most
ϕ. If P = Rn, we require ϕ ≥ n+ 1. The triple (P ;n,ϕ) is called a well-described polytope.
2. We say that P has vertex-complexity at most ν, if P is the convex hull of a finite set of rational
vectors, all having encoding length at most ν. P = ∅, then we require ν ≥ n.
Lemma 5.4 ([31, Lemma (6.2.4)]). If P has vertex-complexity at most ν, then P has facet-
complexity at most 3n2ν.
Theorem 5.5 ([31, Theorems (6.4.9), (6.5.7)]). For a well-described polyhedron (P ;n,ϕ) given by
a strong separation oracle, there exists oracle-polynomial time algorithm that either returns a vertex
solution x ∈ P , or concludes that P = ∅. Given a linear objective function 〈c, x〉, if P 6= ∅ then
there exists an oracle-polynomial time algorithm that finds an optimal vertex solution to max 〈c, x〉
s.t. x ∈ P .
An oracle-polynomial time algorithm means that the number of arithmetic operations and calls
to the strong separation oracle is bounded as poly(ϕ); note that ϕ ≥ n.
Proof of Lemma 3.7. Let P be the set of feasible solutions and P ∗ the set of optimal solutions
to (EG-Rado). We note that P 6= ∅ since z = 0 is a feasible solution. Further, P ∗ 6= ∅ since
P is bounded. Lemma 5.1 asserts that this is a nonempty polytope with vertex-complexity
poly(|A|, |G|, T, log C, logU); thus (P ∗,∑i∈A |Ei|, ϕ) is a well-described polytope for some ϕ ∈
poly(|A|, |G|, T, log C, logU) by Lemma 5.4.
We now describe the strong separation oracle to P ∗. For a vector z ∈ R×i∈AEi , we first check
whether z ∈ P . Checking the first set of |A| constraints is straightforward. The submodular
constraints can be verified by solving |A| submodular function minimization problems. We either
conclude z ∈ P , or obtain a separating hyperplane for z and P that is also a separating hyperplane
for z and P ∗.
If z ∈ P , the we compute the gradient ∇f(z), where f(z) denotes the objective function. We
then solve the linear optimization problem max〈∇f(z), x〉 s.t. x ∈ P . (P ∗,∑i∈A |Ei|,∑i∈A |Ei|+
log T ) is a well-described polytope since all coefficients are 0 and 1 and the left hand side values are at
most T . Using the strong separation oracle for P we just described, the second half of Theorem 5.5
shows that we can find an optimal solution x∗ ∈ P in time poly(|A|, |G|, T, log C, logU).
If max〈∇f(z), x∗〉 = max〈∇f(z), z〉, i.e., if z itself is an optimal solution, then we conclude that
z ∈ P ∗. Otherwise, 〈∇f(z), x〉 > 〈∇f(z), z〉 is a valid separating hyperplane.
Thus, by the first half of Theorem 5.5, we can find an optimal solution x ∈ P ∗ in time
poly(|A|, |G|, T, log C, logU).
This method requires the implementation of the ellipsoid method for linear optimization inside
the separation oracle. We now show that this can be easily avoided by always using the hyperplane
〈∇f(z), x〉 > 〈∇f(z), z〉, without solving the LP. If z ∈ P \ P ∗, then this is always valid, but if
z ∈ P ∗, then this holds with equality instead of strict inequality.
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Nevertheless, we can run the ellipsoid method using the gradients as separating directions
(without solving the LP). This ultimately leads to concluding P ∗ = ∅, since the algorithm returns a
separating hyperplane for every z ∈ R×i∈AEi . At this point, we consider the feasible solution z ∈ P
with the largest objective value f(z) visited by the algorithm, and conclude that this solution must
have been optimal. This is true since if no optimal solutions would have been visited, then every
separating hyperplane we used would be a valid strong separator for P ∗, and thus, we could not
have reached the false conclusion P ∗ = ∅.
Remark 5.6. We note that a similar argument was used by Jain [37, Theorem 12], showing
that whenever a convex set is given with a strong separation oracle and is guaranteed to contain
a point of bit-complexity at most ν, then a feasible solution can be found in polynomial time,
using simultaneous Diophantine approximation. Our proof leverages the stronger property that
the optimal solution set P ∗ is a well-described polytope.
5.2 Sparse solutions to Eisenberg-Gale relaxation
In this section we prove Lemma 3.8. Recall that the polytope P ∗ is the set of optimal solutions
to (EG-Rado) as in Lemma 5.1. In Lemma 5.7 and Corollary 5.8, we show that the solution of
every vertex solution of P ∗ is sparse. In Lemma 3.8 we further sparsify such a solution by losing at
most half of the value for each agent. The arguments in both steps rely on bounding the number
of non-zero variables in particular linear systems.
Consider an optimal solution z for (EG-Rado) that is also a basic solution to P ∗. According
to Theorem 5.5, we can require that the optimal solution found in Lemma 3.7 is a basic solution.
We define v∗i :=
∑
k∈Vi
cijkzijk as the optimum utility value attained by agent i ∈ A′; by strict
convexity of the objective, these values are the same for all optimal solutions.
Lemma 5.7. Every optimal solution z ∈ P ∗ satisfies |supp(z′)| ≤ |A′| + 2|L+(z′)| − |R1| − |R2|,
where
L+(z) =

j ∈ L :
∑
i∈A′
∑
k∈Vi
zijk > 0

 ,
R1 = {j ∈ L : ∃! i ∈ A′ such that 0 <
∑
k∈Vi
zijk < 1},
R2 = {j ∈ L : ∃! i ∈ A′ such that zijk = 1 for some k ∈ Vi} .
The set L+ is the set of allocated items in L by z; R1 is the set of items in L each of which is
allocated to one agent only, but the item is not fully allocated; and R2 is the set of items in L each
of which is fully allocated to agent via single edge of the graph (G, Vi;Ei). Obviously, R1 and R2
are disjoint.
Proof of Lemma 5.7. The following LP gives a description of P ∗. We note that this is a different
description from the extended system in the proof of Lemma 5.1: here, we can make use of the
optimal values v∗i and thus do not require the dual variables. Note that the notion of vertex
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solutions is independent of the describing system.∑
j∈L,k∈Vi
cijkzijk ≥ vˆ∗i ∀i ∈ A′
∑
i∈A′,k∈Vi
zijk ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ L
∑
j∈L,k∈S
zijk ≤ ri(S) ∀i ∈ A′,∀S ⊆ Vi
z ≥ 0 .
In order to prove the bound on the support of a vertex (basic feasible) solution to P ∗, we upper-
bound the number of linearly independent tight constraints. Trivially, there are at most |A′| tight
constraints of the first type. By definition of sets L+ and R1 there are at most |L+| − |R1| tight
constraints of the second type.
Let us bound the maximal number of tight submodular constraints. By Claim 5.2, for each
agent i ∈ A′, the maximal set of linearly independent tight submodular constraints forms a chain.
Formally, for i ∈ A′ there exist sets Si1 ⊂ Si2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Sihi ⊆ Vi, such that the set of constraints
{∑j∈G,k∈Sit zijk ≤ ri(Sit)}hit=1 generates all the tight submodular constraints for agent i. All together,
there are at most |A′|+ |L+| − |R1|+
∑
i∈A′ hi tight constraints.
Now, let us consider an element j ∈ R2 and let i be the agent such that zijk = 1 for some
k ∈ Vi. Since ri is rank function we have zijk = 1 = ri({k}). Let Sib be the smallest set in the
i-th chain containing k. Since {k} is also tight we can assume that k = Sib \ Sib−1. Therefore, the
tight inequalities corresponding to Sib, S
i
b−1 and zijk ≤ 1 (or equivalently
∑
k∈Vi
zijk ≤ 1) are not
linearly independent and we can drop the inequality corresponding to zijk ≤ 1 from the minimal set
of linearly independent tight inequalities. In other words, we do not have to count the inequality
corresponding to j, for j ∈ R2 and we can replace the term |L+| by |L+| − |R2|.
Further, by flow conservation we have |L+| ≥
∑
i∈A′,j∈L,k∈Vi
zijk ≥
∑
i∈A′
ri(S
i
hi) ≥
∑
i∈A′
hi. Thus,
|supp(z)| ≤ |A′|+ 2|L+| − |R1| − |R2| .
Corollary 5.8. Consider an optimal vertex solution y of (EG) for Rado valuations. Then,
|supp(y)| ≤ |A′|+ 2|L+(y)| − |L1(y)|, where
L+(y) = {j ∈ L :
∑
i∈A′
yij > 0},
L1(y) = {j ∈ L : ∃!i ∈ A′ such that yij > 0}.
Proof. The optimal vertex solution y can be written as yij =
∑
(i,k)∈Ei
zijk for a vertex solution z
of P ∗. We have |supp (z)| ≤ |A′|+2|L+| − |R1| − |R2|. The first condition holds by definition of y.
By construction we also have L+(y) = L+(z) =: L+. Moreover, R1, R2 ⊆ L1.
By definition of L1, R1 and R2; we have j ∈ L1 \ (R1 ∪R2) if and only if j is allocated fully to
a unique agent i and there exist different k1, k2 ∈ Vi with zijk1 > 0 and zijk2 > 0. Both variables
zijk1 and zijk2 contribute that yij > 0 for the same i, j. Thus,
|supp(y)| ≤ |A′|+ 2|L+| − |R1| − |R2| − |L1 \ (R1 ∪R2)| = |A′|+ 2|L+| − |L1|.
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Further sparsification We showed that any basic optimal solution to (EG) under Rado valu-
ations has support of size |A′| + 2|L+| − |L1|. Next, we show that any such sparse solution can
be further sparsified by losing a fraction of valuation of each agent. The main observation is that
given a feasible allocation for a Rado valuation function, all “sub-allocations” behave in a “locally
subadditive” way, as explained next.
Let y′ be a feasible allocation and z′ its corresponding representation in (EG-Rado). Our
argument will scale down yij = qijy
′
ij for some qij ∈ [0, 1]. We have vi(y′i) =
∑
j∈L,k∈Vi
cijkz
′
ijk.
Therefore, we can write vi(y
′
i) =
∑
j∈L u(i, j) where u(i, j) =
∑
k∈Vi
cijkz
′
ijk is the value agent i
gets from good j. Hence, we can represent yij = qijy
′
ij as yij = qij
∑
k∈Vi
z′ijk. Assuming qij ∈ [0, 1]
we have
vi(yi) ≥
∑
j∈L,k∈Vi
qij · cijkz′ijk =
∑
j∈L
qij · u(i, j) ,
where we use the fact that whenever z′ is feasible for (EG-Rado) then so is the allocation given by
qijz
′
ijk for j ∈ L, k ∈ Vi. In particular, this justifies the notation yij = qijy′ij for qij ∈ [0, 1] and it
holds that vi(yi) ≥
∑
j∈L qiju(i, j). Such a property is used to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.8. Suppose the functions vi are Rado valuations, and let yˆ be a feasible solution to (EG).
Then, in polynomial time we can find a feasible solution y such that
(i) vi(y) ≥ 12vi(yˆ),
(ii) |supp(y)| ≤ 2|A′|+ |L+| where L+ := L+(y) = {j ∈ G \ H :∑i∈A′ yij > 0}.
Given a yˆ, we can transform it to a vector y′ with |supp(y′)| ≤ |A′| + 2|L+(y′)| − |L1(y′)| by
Corollary 5.8. Then, the idea is to exhibit q such that the vector y defined as yij = qijy
′
ij satisfies
the lemma. Such q needs to preserve at least half of the value for each agent and should set at least
|L+| − |L1| − |A′| values of y′ij to 0. We can find such a q as a basic feasible solution of a system
of linear (in)equalities.
Proof. Let y′ be a solution of (EG) with |supp(y′)| ≤ |A′| + 2|L+(y′)| − |L1(y′)|, given by Corol-
lary 5.8. Let D = {j ∈ L+(y′) : ∃i, i′, i 6= i′ such that y′ij > 0 and y′i′j > 0}, i.e., D is the set of
items in L+(y′) allocated to at least two different agents by y′. Hence, |D| = |L+(y′)| − |L1(y′)|.
For each j ∈ D, let D(j) be a set containing two different agents i, i′ getting the item j in y′. Such
two agents are picked arbitrarily, but fixed throughout the proof for each j. Let A′′ = ∪j∈DD(j).
We consider the following linear system with variables q. The value qij represents the fraction
of y′ij agent i keeps. By the above, if agent obtained u(i, j) value from y
′
ij units of j then agent
receives qiju(i, j) value from qijy
′
ij units of good j whenever qij ∈ [0, 1].∑
j∈D
qiju(i, j) ≥ 1
2
∑
j∈D
u(i, j) ∀i ∈ A′′
qij + qi′j = 1 ∀j ∈ D, {i, i′} = D(j)
q ≥ 0 .
Let us define y: set yij = 0 if qij = 0 and yij = y
′
ij for all other values. Then for any feasible q
we have
• The second set of constraints together with non-negativity of q guarantees qij ∈ [0, 1] and
hence we can treat the values vi(yi) ≥ qijvi(y′i) as described before the statement of the
lemma.
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• By the first set of constraints and definition of y, we have
vi(yi) ≥
∑
j∈D
qiju(i, j) +
∑
j∈L\D
u(i, j) ≥ 1
2
∑
j∈D
u(i, j) +
1
2
∑
j∈L\D
u(i, j) ≥ 1
2
vi(y
′) .
Therefore, any feasible solution of the linear system in q gives an allocation that satisfies the
first condition of the lemma. Let us show that the system is indeed feasible. Namely, setting qij =
1
2
for all i ∈ A′′ and all j ∈ D we see that the above system is feasible. Since, the system is feasible
we can also find a basic feasible solution q. By counting the number of tight constraints we show
that there are at least |L+(y′)|− |L1(y′)|− |A′′| zeros in q. Thus, allocation y defined as yij = qijy′ij
will have support smaller by at least |L+(y′)| − |L1(y′)| − |A′′|.
The maximum number of (tight) constraints is obviously |A′′| + |D|. Therefore, |supp(q)| ≤
|A′′| + |D|. Crucially, by the second constraint we have L+(y) = L+(y′). Hence, we only need
to compare |supp(y′)| and |supp(y)|. The allocation y′ has exactly 2|D| positive variables when
restricted on D and A′′. On the other hand, q and therefore y take at most |D| + |A′′| non-
zero values on D and A′′. It follows that y has at least |D| − |A′′| less positive variables than
y′, i.e., |supp(y)| ≤ |supp(y′)| − (|D| − |A′′|). By Corollary 5.8 and since |A′′| ≤ |A′| we have
|supp(y)| ≤ 2|A′|+2|L+|− |L1(y′)|− |D|. By recalling that |D| = |L+|− |L1(y′)| we get |supp(y)| ≤
2|A′|+ |L+|.
6 Phase V: Rounding the mixed solution
We present the rounding for a sparse solution of (Mixed+matching). We recall that by sparse we
mean a feasible solution (y, π) of (Mixed+matching) satisfying:
supp(y) ≤ 2|A|+ |L+| where L+ =
{
j ∈ G \ H :
∑
i∈A′
yij > 0
}
.
Such a sparse solution is rounded by setting 2|A| positive variables in y to 0, i.e., a reduction of
(y, π) and allocating the items according to the support of the reduction. Formally, by a reduction
of (y, π) we mean a mixed integer solution (yr, π) obtained as follows (see Figure 1). For each item
j a fraction of which is allocated by y (i.e., j ∈ L+), we pick an arbitrary agent κ(j) getting the
item (i.e., yκ(j)j > 0). We set y
r
κ(j)j = yκ(j)j, and set y
r
ij = 0 if i 6= κ(j). In words, the agent κ(j)
keeps getting the same amount in reduction and no other agent receives any part of item j. By the
bound on supp(y), this amounts to setting ≤ 2|A| values yij to 0. Looking at the reduction from
the agents perspective: let di be the number of items agent i lost by reduction, i.e., the number of
items j for which yij > 0 and y
r
ij = 0. Then,
∑
i∈A′ di ≤ 2|A|.
The reduction (yr, π) might have an arbitrarily worse objective value than (y, π) (e.g., if for
agent i we have viπ(i) = 0 and reduction sets y
r
i = 0), but we show that we can find a different
assignment ρ such that (yr, ρ) is only worse by a constant factor than (y, π), no matter how the
reduction is carried out. The assignment ρ is obtained as a combination of τ (the assignment
obtained in Phase I) and π.
For a fixed reduction and the values di, ρ and its properties are given by the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1 (Key rounding lemma). Let H be the set of most preferred items, (y, π) a feasible
solution to (Mixed+matching), and let di ∈ N, (di ≥ 1) for each i ∈ A. In O(|A|) time, we can
find an assignment ρ such that
NSW(y, ρ) ≥ 1
2
(∏
i∈A
(di + 1)
−wi
)1/∑i∈A wi
NSW(y, π)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
agents: items:
a1 a2 a3
supp(y):
a1 a2 a3
supp(yr):
Figure 1: Support graph of an allocation y. Support graph of reduction yr obtained by κ(1) =
κ(2) = κ(3) = a1, κ(4) = κ(5) = κ(6) = κ(7) = a2, and κ(8) = κ(9) = a3. It follows that da1 = 2,
da2 = 1 and da3 = 3.
and for each i ∈ A it holds either
(a) viρ(i) ≥ 1di vi(yi), or
(b) for each j ∈ L it holds vij ≤ 1di+1(vi(yi) + viρ(i)).
Intuitively, the above lemma states that starting with a feasible allocation y, we can find an as-
signment ρ that might have smaller NSW(y, ρ) than NSW(y, π) but has the following nice property
for each agent i ∈ A:
• In case (a), i values the item ρ(i) at least as she values a 1/di fraction of yi (and thus at least
a 1/(di +1) fraction of vi(yi) + viρ(i)). Hence, agent i keeps a 1/(di +1)-fraction of her value
just by keeping ρ(i) even if we can take away all items i gets from L.
• In case (b), every item L has a small value for i when compared to the combined value of yi
and ρ(i). That is, i values yi and ρ(i) significantly more than any di items combined from L.
Looking at it from the other side, even if we were to take away any di in L items from i she
will still keep a fraction of the value.
The essence of both cases is that the reduction will not hurt the agent too much. Before we present
the proof of Lemma 6.1, we show that this is enough to prove Lemma 3.9.
Lemma 3.9. Let H be the set of most preferred items, and let (y, π) be a solution to (Mixed+matching)
as in Theorem 3.5. Let (yr, π) be a reduction of (y, π). Then in polynomial-time we can find a
matching ρ : A → H such that
NSW(yr, ρ) ≥ 1
32γ2
NSW(y, π) .
Further, if the valuations are linear, then we can find a matching ρ : A → H such that NSW(yr, ρ) ≥
1
8NSW(y, π).
Proof of Lemma 3.9. We first prove the lemma for the general case. Let yr be any reduction of
y and let di be the number items agent i lost in reduction. By sparsity in Theorem 3.5 we have∑
i∈A di ≤ 2|A|.
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We use Lemma 6.1 to obtain ρ. Note that Lemma 6.1 requires di ≥ 1 so we define di =
max{1, di}. Thus, now we have the bound
∑
i∈A(di + 1) ≤ 4|A|. Let ρ be the matching obtained
by Lemma 6.1 given di’s and y. By Lemma 2.7 we have that(∏
i∈A
(di + 1)
−wi
)1/∑i∈A wi
≥ 1
4γ
.
Thus, NSW(y, ρ) ≥ 18γNSW(y, π). By the same inequality, it suffices to show that NSW(yr, ρ) ≥(∏
i∈A(di + 1)
−wi
)∑
i∈Awi NSW(y, ρ). We do so, by showing that for each i ∈ A it holds vi(yri ) +
viρ(i) ≥ 1di+1(vi(yi) + viρ(i)). By Lemma 6.1 for agent i we have either (a) or (b).
(a) In this case we have diviρ(i) ≥ vi(yi). Thus, viρ(i) ≥ 1di+1(vi(yi) + viρ(i)). Consequently,
vi(y
r
i ) + viρ(i) ≥ 1di+1(vi(yi) + viρ(i)).
(b) We have vij ≤ 1di+1 (vi(yi) + viρ(i)) for all j ∈ L. Denote with Di the set of di items j
for which yij > 0 and y
r
ij = 0. By subadditivity vi(Di) ≤
∑
j∈Di
vij . Therefore, vi(Di) ≤
di
di+1
(vi(yi)+viρ(i)) ≤ didi+1(vi(yi)+viρ(i)). Hence, vi(yi)−vi(Di)+viρ(i) ≥
1
di+1
(vi(yi)+viρ(i)).
By subadditivity and monotonicity we have vi(y
r
i ) ≥ vi(yi) − vi(Di), proving in this case as
well that vi(y
r
i ) + viρ(i) ≥ 1di+1(vi(yi) + viρ(i)). The lemma follows.
For additive valuations, we recall Theorem 3.6. It gives us an optimal solution of (EG) that
is supported on a forest in which each tree contains an agent. In particular, this implies a nice
property for the reductions of y. Namely, we can choose a reduction yr in which di ≤ 1 for each
agent i ∈ A. Such a reduction is obtained by rooting each tree of the forest at an arbitrary agent
and letting κ(j) to be the parent agent of item j. Informally, each agent loses at most one item.
Therefore, di = 1 for all i ∈ A. The lemma follows by Lemma 6.1.
The proof of Lemma 6.1 is presented in the following section.
6.1 Constructing the new matching
Recall Phase I where we defined τ as an assignment maximizing
(∏
i∈A v
wi
iτ(i)
)
and H the set
of items assigned by τ . We number the agents A = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and renumber the items H =
{1, 2, . . . , n} such that τ = {(i, i) : i ∈ A}. In other words, τ assigns item i ∈ G to agent i ∈ A.
Intuition We are given a feasible solution (y, π) of (Mixed+matching) and τ . For the sake
of illustration assume that by using the matching τ instead of π we don’t lose too much in the
objective, i.e.,
NSW(y, τ) ≥
(∏
i∈A
(di + 1)
−wi
)1/∑i∈A wi
NSW(y, π) .
In this case, each agent i gets the item i from H. Let us show that under the above assumption we
can set ρ = τ , i.e., that for each agent i either (a) or (b) holds.
Claim 6.2. Let i ∈ A. Then either vii > 1di vi(yi) or for any j ∈ L it holds vij ≤ 1di+1(vii + vi(yi))
Proof of Claim. By the optimality of τ it then holds vii ≥ vij for all j ∈ L. If vii ≥ 1di vi(yi) then (a)
holds. Otherwise, we have that divii < vi(yi). Combining it with vij < vii, we have that
(di + 1)vij ≤ (di + 1)vii < vi(yi) + vii = vi(yi) + viτ(i) . 
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Therefore, our goal is to construct ρ by “replacing” as much of π with τ without losing too much
in the objective. By Claim 6.2 for any agent for which ρ(i) = τ(i) we will have either (a) and (b).
We formalize this idea below, and give a way of constructing ρ such that even when ρ(i) 6= τ(i)
still we have either (a) and (b).
Algorithm Let (y, π) be a feasible solution of (Mixed+matching). We denote with Yi the value
agent i gets in y, i.e., Yi = vi(yi). We construct new assignment ρ by combining π and τ . In
particular, whenever π(i) = τ(i) then we set ρ(i) := π(i) = τ(i) and otherwise exactly one of the
following will be the case: ρ(i) = τ(i), ρ(i) = π(i) or ρ(i) = ∅. Notation ρ(i) = ∅ represents the
case that i is not allocated any item from H. (Formally, we can allocate one item to each agent
since |H| = |A| but as some agents might value some items at 0 it is simpler to say that agent is
not allocated an item by ρ.)
Consider the symmetric difference of the two assignments π∆τ . Each component is an al-
ternating cycle; we consider the components one-by-one. Take any component C of π∆τ with c
agents and c items. Let the agents in the component be a1, a2, . . . , ac. The numbering is modulo
c: ac+k = ak for all k ∈ Z. By the convention on the numbering, the corresponding items are also
numbered a1, a2, . . . , ac, and (ak, ak) ∈ τ for all k ∈ [c]. We order the agents around the cycle such
that (ak, ak−1) ∈ π for all k ∈ [c]. Let B := B(C) = {t ∈ [c] : Yat > datvatat−1}. We consider two
cases based on the size of B:
|B| = 0. In this case we set ρ(at) = π(at) = at−1 for all t ∈ [c].
|B| ≥ 1. First, we trim π by setting π(at) = ∅ for each t ∈ B. We have Yat+vatat−1Yat ≤ 2 for each t ∈ B
since dat ≥ 1. In words, each agent losses at most half of her value.
After trimming π, the connected component C decomposes into several alternating paths, see
Figure 2. Consider one such path, starting in agent ak and ending in item ar. It follows that
k ∈ B and t 6∈ B for all k < t ≤ r. We consider the following ratio that measures the change
in the objective value by augmenting π over the previously mentioned path:
ϕ(C, k, r) :=
(
Yak
vakak + Yak
)wak r∏
t=k+1
(
vatat−1 + Yat
vatat + Yat
)wat
.
If it holds that ϕ(C, k, r) ≤∏r−1t=k (dat +1)wat then we say that the interval [k, r] is reversible.
Moreover, we set ρ(at) = τ(at) = at for all k ≤ t ≤ r. If [k, r] is not reversible then we set
ρ(ak) = ∅ and ρ(at) = π(at) = at for all k < t ≤ r. We do the same for every augmenting
path.
To prove Lemma 6.1, we first show that by changing the assignment from π to ρ the objective
value of (Mixed+matching) cannot decrease by too much.
Lemma 6.3. The assignment ρ can be constructed in linear time (in n), and it holds
NSW(y, π)
NSW(y, ρ)
≤ 2 ·
(∏
i∈A
(di + 1)
wi
)1/∑i∈A wi
.
Proof. It suffices to prove the lemma for each of the connected components C of π∆τ . For |B| = 0
the lemma holds trivially. So assume that |B| ≥ 1 for the rest of the proof.
The procedure terminates in linear time, as we only require one pass through the agents and
items in C. To prove the bound on NSW(y,ρ)
NSW(y,π)
, we show that for every interval [k, r] the objective
value “before averaging” decreases at most by factor 2wak
∏r
t=k(dat + 1)
wat .
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a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
a9 a10
a9 a10
σ :
ρ :
agents: items:pi :
C :
a1
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
a9 a10
a9 a10
C :
a1
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
a9 a10
a9 a10 a1
B = {4, 9}
trim
[4, 8] reveresible
[9, 3] non-reveresible
Figure 2: Assignments τ, π, and ρ resulting from B = {4, 9} and reversible interval [4, 8].
If interval [k, r] is not reversible, then the change in the objective function is captured by(
vakak−1+Yak
Yak
)wak
, as for every agent at with t ∈ [k + 1, r], we have ρ(at) = π(at), and ρ(ak) = ∅.
Since k ∈ B, it follows that Yak > dakvakak−1 ≥ vakak−1 . Thus,
(
vakak−1+Yak
Yak
)wak
< 2wak .
If, on the other hand, [k, r] is reversible, then the difference in the objectives is captured by
(
vakak−1 + Yak
vakak + Yak
)wak r∏
t=k+1
(
vatat−1 + Yat
vatat + Yat
)wat
=
(
vakak−1 + Yak
Yak
· Yak
vakak + Yak
)wak r∏
t=k+1
(
vatat−1 + Yat
vatat + Yat
)wat
As [k, r] is reversible ϕ(C, k, r) =
(
Yak
vakak+Yak
)wak · ∏rt=k+1 (vatat−1+Yatvatat+Yat
)wat
<
∏r
t=k(dat + 1)
wat .
Since k ∈ B and dak ≥ 1 we again have
vakak−1+Yak
Yak
< 2. Hence, the change in the objective value
is bounded by 2wak ·∏rt=k(dat + 1)wat .
It is left to show that for each agent i either (a) or (b) holds. Recall that Yi = vi(yi).
Lemma 6.4. Let i ∈ A. Then we either have
(a) viρ(i) ≥ 1di vi(yi), or
(b) for each j ∈ L it holds vij ≤ 1di+1(vi(yi) + viρ(i)).
To prove the lemma we use the following simple claim, which can applied to any agent i 6∈ B:
Claim 6.5. For any agent i ∈ A, if Yi ≤ diviπ(i), then
viπ(i) + Yi
vii + Yi
≤ (di + 1)viπ(i)
vii
.
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Proof of Lemma 6.4. If ρ(i) = i, that is, agent i receives the same item in ρ as in τ then the lemma
follows by Claim 6.2. For the rest of the proof we assume ρ(i) 6= i. Hence, either ρ(i) = π(i) or
ρ(i) = ∅.
We consider the component C of τ∆π containing an agent i. We use the notation as before,
denoting the agents in C by a1, a2, . . . , ac, and letting i = ak.
If ρ(ak) = π(ak) = ak−1 then for i it holds (a). Namely, ρ(ak) = ak−1 implies that k 6∈ B as
otherwise this would be trimmed. Thus Yak ≤ dakvakak−1 ; or equivalently vakak−1 ≥ 1dak Yak .
If on the other hand ρ(ak) = ∅, we have that k ∈ B and also that the interval [k, r] with starting
and k and ending in r that corresponds to some alternating path in C is not reversible (otherwise,
ρ(ak) = ak). Therefore, ϕ(C, k, r) >
∏r
t=1(dat+1)
wat . Recall that for each such considered interval
we have k ∈ B and t 6∈ B. Starting with ∏rt=k(dat + 1)wat < ϕ(C, k, r) and then by Claim 6.5 we
obtain
1 <
r−1∏
t=k
(dat + 1)
−wat ·
(
Yak
vakak + Yak
)wak
·
r∏
t=2
(
vatat−1 + Yat
vatat + Yat
)wat
≤ (dak + 1)−wak ·
(
Yak
vakak + Yak
)wak
·
r∏
t=2
(
vatat−1
vatat
)wat
.
We further bound
1 < (dak + 1)
−wak ·
(
Yak
vakj
· vakj
vakak
)wak
·
r∏
t=2
(
vatat−1
vatat
)wat
.
By the optimal choice of τ , for every j ∈ L we have
1 ≤
(
vakak
vakj
)wak
·
r∏
t=2
(
vatat
vatat−1
)wat
.
Combining the last two inequalities, we obtain Yak > (dak + 1)vakj . Hence, in this case (b) holds,
by recalling that i = ak and ρ(ak) = ∅.
7 Rado valuations and M♮-concave functions
In this section, we prove Lemma 2.5 showing that Rado valuations are M♮-concave and Lemma 7.2
showing that the function ν as defined in Theorem 2.6 is indeed the continuous closure of the Rado
valuation. We also discuss related conjectures on constructive characterizations of M♮-concave
functions.
7.1 Rado valuations are M♮-concave
Rado valuations turn out to be a special case of a more general construction described in [49],
called ‘transformation by networks’. We now present it in the special case when the network is a
bipartite graph (instead of a directed graph) with linear edge costs (instead of concave functions),
and the functions are restricted to the binary domain (instead of the nonnegative integer lattice).
Theorem 7.1 ([49, Chapter 9.6.1],[52, Section 6.2]). Let H = (G, V ′;E′) be a bipartite graph with
cost function c′ : E′ → R+. Given an M♮-concave function g : {0, 1}V ′ → R ∪ {−∞} the following
function g˜ : {0, 1}G → R is also M♮-concave:
g˜(x) = max
y∈{0,1}V ′ ,z∈{0,1}G×V ′

g(y) + c′(z) :
∑
k∈V ′
zkj = xj ,∀j ∈ G and
∑
j∈G
zkj = yk ,∀k ∈ V ′

 .
(10)
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We use the transformation to show that the Rado valuation functions are M♮-concave.
Lemma 2.5. Every Rado valuation v : 2G → R is an M♮-concave function.
Proof. Consider a Rado valuation v as in Definition 2.4, given by a bipartite graph (G, V ;E) with
a cost function c : E → R on the edges, and a matroid M = (V,I) with rank function r.
Let us define V ′ = V ∪D with a set D of |G| dummy nodes. Let E′ be the union of E and a
perfect matching of dummy edges between G and D. Let c′e = ce for all e ∈ E and c′e = 0 on all new
dummy edges. Let us define a matroid M′ = (V ′,I ′) where a set S ∈ I ′ if and only if S ∩ V ∈ I;
that is, we add the dummy elements in D freely to the matroid. We define
g(y) =
{
0 if y = χS for some S ∈ I ′ ,
−∞ otherwise. (11)
As the indicator function of the independent sets of a matroid, g is well-known to be M♮-concave
(see e.g. [49, Section 4.7]). We claim that g˜ defined in (10) equals the Rado valuation v.
First, for S ⊆ G, let M be the maximum cost matching in the definition of v(S). We can extend
this to a perfect matching M ′ with δS(M
′) = S by adding dummy edges incident to the nodes in
S\δS(M). We then define z = χM ′ and y = χδV ′ (M ′). Thus, g˜(χS) ≥ g(y)+c′(z) = 0+c(M) = v(S).
Conversely, consider the optimal (y, z) in the definition of g˜(χS). By the above bound, we know
that g˜(χS) ≥ v(S) ≥ 0 is finite, and therefore g(y) = 0. The set of (non-dummy) edges e ∈ E
with ze = 1 thus form a matching with δV (M) ∈ I, δG(M) ⊆ S, and c(M) = g˜(χS), showing that
g˜(χS) ≤ v(S).
7.2 Concave closure of Rado valuations
We now complete the proof of Theorem 2.6, showing that the function ν defined in (6) is indeed
the continuous extension of the Rado valuation v.
The value g(x) for x ∈ [0, 1]m is defined by a linear program (5).8 In the proof, we will use the
dual LP:
v¯(x) =min p⊤x+ α
s.t.: p(S) + α ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ G
(p, α) ∈ Rm+1
max
∑
S⊆G
λSv(S)
s.t.:
∑
S⊆G
λSχS = x
∑
S⊆G
λS = 1
λ ≥ 0
(12)
Lemma 7.2. Let v be a Rado valuation given by a bipartite graph (G, V ;E) with costs on the edges
c : E → R, and a matroid M = (V,I) with a rank function r = rM as in Definition 2.4. Let ν(x)
8For M♮-concave functions defined over the lattice Zn, the definition of the extension includes a constraint for
every lattice point, thus, the system is not finite. Still, it can be described by a ‘local’ linear program, see [49, (3.64)
and Theorem 6.42].
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be the function defined in (6), that is,
ν(x) := max
∑
(j,k)∈E
cjkzjk
s.t.:
∑
k∈V
zjk ≤ xj ∀j ∈ G
∑
j∈G,k∈T
zjk ≤ r(T ) ∀T ⊆ V
z ≥ 0 .
Then, v(x) = ν(x) holds for every x ∈ Rm+ .
Proof. We letM(x) denote the set of feasible solutions of (6). Fix any x ∈ Rm. We first show that
v(x) ≤ ν(x).
Consider an optimal solution λ for the dual LP in (12) such that v(x) =
∑
S⊆G λSv(S). For
every S ⊆ G, we have an integral allocation MS of the goods inM(χS) that is optimal in the linear
program (6) defining ν(χS) = v(S); these two are equal using Theorem 2.6. It is easy to see that∑
S⊆G λSMS ∈M(x). Thus, v(x) ≤ ν(x).
For the other direction v(x) ≥ ν(x), let z be the optimal solution defining ν(x) in (6). By the
integrality of the bipartite matching polytope, we can write the fractional matching z as a convex
combinations of integral allocations MS for S ⊆ G, i.e., z =
∑
S⊆G λSMS for some λ ≥ 0 with∑
λS = 1. The dual of (6) is
min
∑
j∈G
xjπj +
∑
T⊆V
ρT
s.t.: πj +
∑
T :k∈T
ρT ≥ cjk ∀j ∈ G,∀T ⊆ V
π ∈ RG+, ρ ∈ R2
V
+ .
Consider an optimal dual solution (π, ρ). By complementarity, πi +
∑
S:k∈T ρT = cjk for every
(j, k) ∈ supp(z); if ρT > 0 for T ⊆ V then z(δ(T )) = r(T ), and if πj > 0 for j ∈ G then
z(δ(j)) = xj .
Since z =
∑
S λSMS , we have MS ⊆ supp(z), and δMS (S) = r(S) whenever z(δ(S)) = r(S).
Further, z(δ(j)) = xj implies that every matching MS with j ∈ S covers j. We see that χMS and
(π, ρ) satisfy complementary slackness in (6) for every set S with λS > 0. Thus, c(MS) = ν(χS),
and ν(χS) = v(S) again by Theorem 2.6. We can thus conclude that
ν(x) =
∑
S⊆G
λSc(MS) =
∑
S⊆G
λSv(S) ≤ v¯(x) ,
completing the proof.
7.3 Conjectures on characterizing M♮-concave functions
First, we answer Frank’s question negatively, showing that Rado valuations do not cover the entire
class of M♮-concave valuations. Lehmann et al. [45, Example 1] gave an example that is an M♮-
concave (gross substitutes) valuation but not OXS. We show that the same example is also not a
Rado valuation; the proof is similar.
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Lemma 7.3. Consider the following valuation on the ground set G = {1, 2, 3, 4}. We define
v(S) = 10 if |S| = 1, and v(S) = 19 for all sets with |S| ≥ 2 except v({1, 3}) = v({2, 4}) = 15.
This is M♮-concave, but not a Rado valuation function.
Proof. The proof that v is a gross substitutes/M♮-concave valuation is given in [45, Claim 2]. Let
us show that it is not a Rado valuation. For a contradiction, assume v is a Rado valuation as in
Definition 2.4. We can assume that the matroid on V does not contain any loops (rank-0 elements),
and any parallel elements, i.e., any set S ⊆ V with |S| ≥ 2 and r(S) = 1; we can contract any such
set to a single element and obtain another representation.
Trivially, we can assume that no edge in the bipartite graph (G, V ;E) has cost more than 10.
By v({1}) = 10 we have an element u ∈ V with c1u = 10. Since v({2}) = 10, there is u′ ∈ V
such that c2u′ = 10. Since v({1, 2}) < 20 we have u′ = u as otherwise (1, u), (2, u′) would be an
independent matching of cost 20, since r({u, u′}) = 2 by the above assumption.
An analogous argument shows that cju = 10 for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. We must have cjk ≤ 5 for
any j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and any k ∈ V \ {v}, as otherwise we would have an independent matching of
cost > 15 covering {1, 3} or {2, 4}, again using the assumption of no parallel elements in V . Now,
it is clear that we cannot realize v({1, 2}) = 19.
The reason why Rado valuations are not a rich enough class is that it is not closed under
endowment operations. Given a valuation v : 2G → R and a subset T ⊆ G, we can define the
valuation v′ : 2G
′\T → R+ as
v′(X) = v(X ∪ T )− v(T ) .
Using Definition 2.2, it is immediate that if v is M♮-concave than so is v′. It is not difficult to check
that the example in Lemma 7.3 arises as the endowment of a Rado valuation, showing that Rado
valuations are not closed under endowment operations.
Endowment can be seen as a minor operation. Let us say that v is a Rado minor valuation if it
arises from a Rado valuation by the endowment operation. Note that this class is trivially closed
for endowment. This motivates the following conjecture:
Conjecture 7.4. Every M♮-concave valuation arises as a Rado minor valuation.
Ostrovsky and Paes Leme [57] previously posed the following stronger “matroid based valuation
conjecture”. We define the merging/convolution of the valuations v1, v2 : 2
G → R as
v∗(S) = max
T⊆S
v1(T ) + v2(S \ T ) ∀S ⊆ G .
Merging two M♮-concave functions results in an M♮-concave function.
Conjecture 7.5 (Ostrovsky and Paes Leme [57]). Every M♮-concave valuation arises by the re-
peated application of endowment and merging operations starting from weighted matroid rank func-
tions.
This conjecture is still open. Tran [65] showed that only allowing merging above is not sufficient,
even if starting from a slightly broader class also including partition valuations.
Conjecture 7.4 is a natural weakening of Conjecture 7.5: weighted matroid rank functions form
a subclass of Rado valuations, and it is easy to verify that Rado minor valuations are closed under
merging and endowment.
Balkanski and Paes Leme [5] gave a negative answer to the question whether every M♮-concave
valuation arises as a conic combination of (unweighted) matroid rank functions. Note that M♮-
concave functions are not closed under conic combinations, even the sum of two matroid rank
functions may not be M♮-concave. Thus, the questions was whether conic combinations of matroid
ranks forms a superclass of the M♮-concave valuations.
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8 Improved product bound
We show that the bound in Lemma 2.7 can be slightly improved. Throughout the section the
base of the logarithm is e. We recall that the Lamberth function W is the inverse of t 7→ t ln t for
t ∈ R+. For x > e it holds W(x) < log x; and for x > 41.19 it holds W(x) > log x − log(log x),
see [34]. Let ψ(x) =
(
x−2
W(x−2
e
)
)x/(x−2+ x−2
W( x−2e )
)
(for x > 2). Then, by the above bound we get
ψ(x) ≤ max
{
c, x−2
log(x−2
e
)−log log(x−2
e
)
}
for some constant c that depends on 41.19. Now, we can prove
our lemma.
Lemma 8.1. Let n ∈ N, S ⊆ [n], and 1 ≤ w1, . . . , wn < γ − 1. For i ∈ S let ki ∈ R+ such that∑
i∈S ki ≤ c · n. Assuming c is a constant we have(∏
i∈S
kwii
)1/∑ni=1 wi
≤ c · ψ(γ) = O
(
γ
log(γ)
)
.
Proof. We present the proof for c = 1, the general cases easily reduces to c = 1 by scaling. Since
W(x)eW(x) = x we have eW(x−2e )+1 = e · x−2e · 1W(x−2
e
)
= x−2
W(x−2
e
)
. Hence,
(
eW(
x−2
e
)+1
)x/(x−2+eW(x−2e )+1))
=
(
x− 1
W(x−2e )
)x/(x−2+ x−2
W(x−2e )
)
,
for x > 2. It suffices to prove that(∏
i∈S
kwii
)1/∑ni=1 wi
≤
(
eW(
γ−2
e
)+1
)γ/(γ−2+eW( γ−2e )+1))
.
Without loss of generality we can assume that ki ≥ 1. Then the worst case is if wi = γ − 1 for all
i ∈ S and wi = 1 for i ∈ [n] \ S. For fixed size of S (k = |S|), the product
∏
i∈S k
γ−1
i is maximized
when all ki are the same. Hence,
(∏
i∈S k
wi
i
)1/∑ni=1 wi is upper-bounded by (nk )k(γ−1)/(k(γ−1)+n−k).
Let ξ = nk then
(
n
k
)k(γ−1)/(k(γ−1)+n−k)
= ξ(γ−1)/(γ−2+ξ). By the first order conditions, the value
ξ(γ−1)/(γ−2+ξ) achieves the maximum for ξ = eW(
γ−2
e
)+1. Hence,
(n
k
)kγ/(kγ+n−k) ≤ (eW(γ−2e )+1)(γ−1)/
(
γ−2+eW(
γ−2
e )+1)
)
.
9 Connection to spending restricted equilibrium
The first constant factor approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare problem was given
by Cole and Gkatzelis [17] using the so-called spending restricted (SR) equilibrium. Since then, the
SR-equilibrium is one of the main concepts used in the design of the approximation algorithms for
the NSW problem [2, 18, 27, 28].
An important feature of the SR-equilibrium is that the items highly valued by the agents are
recognized as items with price more than 1 (expensive) in the equilibrium. Isolating such items is
at the essence of the approximation algorithms in the literature. The main idea is that each of the
expensive items must be allocated integrally to one agent only, thereby preventing the unbounded
integrality gap arising when several agents share a very desirable good, see [17, Lemma 3.1].
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In this section, we illustrate a connection between the approach we use and the SR-equilibrium.
In that light, for the rest of the section we focus on the case of symmetric Nash social welfare
problem where agents have additive valuations. We show that the set of the most preferred items
H obtained in Phase I contains all the expensive items in an SR-equilibrium. Similarly to the
algorithms relying on the SR-equilibrium where expensive items have special status during rounding,
the items in H are allocated integrally throughout our algorithm. Intuitively, this is how we are
overcoming the unbounded integrality gap.
SR-equilibrium We quickly recall the necessary definitions and refer the reader to [17] for more
details. The market consists of a set of divisible items G, agents A each of which has a budget of
1 and an additive valuation function over the items. A valuation of agent i is additive if her value
is given as vi(xi) =
∑
j∈G vijxij for all xi ∈ RG+ and vij ∈ R+.
Consider prices p ∈ RG+ for the items in G. We say that an item j is maximum bang per buck
(MBB) for agent i if j ∈ argmaxj∈G{vij/pj}. For an allocation x, the spending of an agent on xi is
p⊤xi and the spending on an item j is
∑
i∈A pjxij . The MBB items are exactly the items an agent
would buy at prices p in order to maximize its valuation such that spending is not more than a
given budget.
Definition 9.1. A spending restricted (SR) equilibrium is a fractional allocation x and a price
vector p such that every agent spends all of her budget on her MBB items at prices p, and the total
spending on each item is equal to min{1, pj}.
By scaling the valuation of each agent we can assume that the maximum bang per buck is one
for all agents. Under such a scaling, in an SR-equilibrium we also have that vij = pj whenever item
j is MBB for agent i and vij < pj otherwise. We work with this assumption for the rest of this
section.
NSW and SR-equilibrium Consider a NSW welfare instance with items G and agents A where
each agent i has additive valuation. For the NSW problem, the valuations are discrete function
and the value of a subset of items S for agent i is given by vi(S) =
∑
j∈S vij . The extension of
an additive valuation vi to R
G
+ is naturally defined as vi(xi) =
∑
j∈G vijxij for all xi ∈ RG+. We
construct the market from the NSW instance from the same set of items G that are now declared
divisible and the set of agents A each equipped with the extension of the discrete additive valuation
and budget one.
Let (x, p) be an SR-equilibrium in such a market. Define the set of expensive goods H as
H := {j ∈ G : pj > 1}. Cole and Gkatzelis [17] proved that
(∏
j∈H pj
)1/|A|
is an upper-bound
on the optimal value of NSW, and gave a rounding algorithm that uses an SR-equilibrium as a
starting point.
In the next lemma we show that H ⊆ H, whereH is the set of the most preferred goods obtained
in Phase I of our algorithm. Recall that τ is an assignment maximizing
(∏
i∈A viτ(i)
)1/|A|
and that
H := τ(A). In words, τ maximizes the NSW welfare under the constraint that each agent gets
exactly one item.
For the purposes of the proof recall that the the spending graph (A,G;Ex) of an allocation x
is defined as ij ∈ Ex if and only if xij > 0.
Lemma 9.2. It holds H ⊆ H.
Proof. Using a cycle canceling argument, we can assume that the spending graph of SR-equilibrium
(x, p) is a forest F . Moreover, since x is an SR-equilibrium allocation, every tree contains at least
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one agent and one item. The next claim states that an expensive item is a leaf in some tree in F
only in a very special case.
Claim 9.3. Let T = (A1,G1;E1) be a tree component of F and j ∈ G1 an item in T . If pj > 1
then either |A1| = |G1| = 1 or j is not a leaf of T .
Proof of Claim. By definition of SR-equilibrium each agent spends all of her budget which is 1. If
j is a leaf, then there is unique agent i buying j. Moreover, i spends all 1 unit of her budget on j
and cannot buy any other item. Thus, A1 = {i} and G1 = {j}. 
Let κ : H → A such that xκ(j)j > 0. Such an function κ exists by definition of SR-equilibrium.
Moreover, by Claim 9.3 we can choose κ to be an assignment (root every tree of F in an arbitrary
item and assign the expensive item to any child agent). We are ready to prove the lemma.
For the sake of contradiction suppose that there is an item j1 ∈ H such that j1 6∈ H. In other
words, pj1 > 1 and j1 is not allocated to any agent by τ . By definition we have H ≤ |A| = |H|.
Consider the component of the symmetric difference τ∆κ containing j. Since j1 6∈ H andH = τ(A),
this component forms a path starting in j1 and ending in a vertex jk+1 in G \ H; see Figure 3.
Let us denote the path as j1, κ(j1), j2, κ(j2), . . . , κ(jk), jk+1 where jt+1 = τ(κ(jt)) for t ∈ [k], and
jt ∈ H for t ≤ k.
j1 j3 j4 j5
κ(j1)
agents: items:
κ(j2) κ(j3) κ(j4)
κ :
σ :
j2 = σ(κ(j1))
j1 ∈ H, j1 ∈ H
for 1 < j ≤ k, ji ∈ H ∩H
jk+1 ∈ H, jk+1 ∈ H
Figure 3: A component of κ∆τ containing j1.
Recall, that MBB of each agent is one, therefore vij = pj for each i, j with xij > 0. By definition
of κ we have that vκ(jt)jt ≥ vκ(jt)jt+1 for t ∈ [k− 1]. Moreover, we have vκ(j1)j1 = pj1 > 1 ≥ pjk+1 ≥
vκ(jk),k+1. Since jt+1 = τ(κ(jt)), augmenting over the above path will contradict the optimality of
τ .
10 Conclusions and future work
We have given a constant factor approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare problem
with Rado valuations, assuming that the weights of the agents are bounded by a constant. Rado
valuations form a broad subclass of gross substitutes valuations. It remains open to obtain a
constant factor approximation for the entire class of gross substitutes valuations, and for even more
general classes, such as submodular valuations. The other main open question is to remove the
assumption of bounded weights, that is, to obtain a constant factor independent of the parameter
γ.
We note that for subadditive valuations, Barman et al. [9] gave an O(n)-approximation and
showed that this is essentially tight: an O(n1−ε) approximation would require an exponential
number of oracle queries for any fixed ε > 0.
The algorithm is based on a mixed integer programming relaxation, and decomposes into a
number of phases. Most reduction steps are applicable for the general subadditive setting. We only
require Rado valuations for Phase IV, to obtain an approximate solution with a small support.
The factor γ only appears in the reduction in Phase II, where we restrict each agent to receiving
only a single item from the set H. Besides extending the result to more general settings, there is
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much scope for improving the approximation factor by using tighter analyses and amortizing across
the different phases.
For example, we expect that a (mild) extension to budget-Rado valuations should be achievable.
Similarly to [15, 27], this means Rado valuations with a cap on the maximum obtainable value for
each agent. This only requires a slightly more careful argument in Phase IV.
Our work also highlights Rado valuations as an interesting class of gross substitutes valuations;
this could be relevant also for other problems in mechanism design: it is a broad class including
most common examples such as weighted matroid rank functions and OXS valuations, yet it has a
rich combinatorial structure that can be exploited for algorithm design.
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